Diversification in the cigarette industry in the 1980\u27s by Alonso, Hector
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Master's Theses Student Research
1988
Diversification in the cigarette industry in the
1980's
Hector Alonso
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/masters-theses
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Alonso, Hector, "Diversification in the cigarette industry in the 1980's" (1988). Master's Theses. 1308.
https://scholarship.richmond.edu/masters-theses/1308
DIVERSIFICAT bN IN THE 
CIGARETTE INDUSTRY 
IN THE 1980'S 
An independent research project submitted 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the MBA degree 
by 
Hector Alonso 
Executive MBA, Class of 1988 
University of Richmond 
March 1, 1988 
CONTENTS 
I. Introduction
II. Historical Perspective
Early History of the Big Six Manufacturers
The Diversification Era
III. Diversification Strategies
Background
General Diversification Strategies
Diversification Strategies of the Big Six
R. J. Reynolds 
Philip Morris 
American 
Lorillard 
Liggett 
Brown and Williamson 
1 
6 
6 
9 
17 
17 
19 
21 
21 
27 
33 
41 
47 
53 
IV. Diversification Strategies and Results, 1979-86 57 
Background
Methodology
Measures of Success
Analysis Acquisitions/Divestitures 
Degree of Diversification 
Profitability of Non-Tobacco Operations 
Return on Assets 
Capital Investments 
- i -
57 
58 
59 
60 
70 
78 
79 
83 
CONTENTS 
v. Conclusions
The Effects of Diversification 
Diversification as a Corporate Strategy 
References 
Appendix - Financial Data 
87 
87 
89 
92 
98 
TABLES 
I. The Big Six Cigarette Manufacturers
II. Domestic Market Share of the Big Six
III. Patterns of Strategic Adaptation Among
the Big Six
IV. Loews Corporation Acquisitions and
Divestitures
v. R. J. Reynolds Acquisitions and
Divestitures
VI. American Brands Acquisitions and
Divestitures
VII. Philip Morris Acquisitions and
5 
15 
16 
66 
67 
68 
Divestitures 69 
VIII. Diversification Indices for the
Independent Cigarette Companies 71 
IX. Tobacco and Non-Tobacco Operating Margins 81 
X. Tobacco and Non-Tobacco Return on Assets 82 
XI. Capital Expenditures 86 
- iii -
FIGURES 
r. Domestic Per Capita Consumption of Cigarettes
rr. Annual Domestic Consumption of Cigarettes 
Ill. R. J. Reynolds Non-Tobacco Revenue and Income 
rv. Philip Mo�ris Non-Tobacco Revenue and Income 
10 
11 
74 
75 
v. American Brands Non-Tobacco Revenue and Income 76 
VI. Loews Corporation Non-Tobacco Revenue and Income 77 
- iv -
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This study is a comparative analysis of the divers ification 
strategies of the six domestic cigarette manufacturers in the 
1980' s . It u ses financial anal ysis to l ook at h ow t h e  
different cigarette manufacturers have inves te d the c ash 
gener ated by the tob acco bu sinesses , and how the companies 
rank in terms of t h eir abil ity to g e ne rate profits and 
stockhol d er wealth in non-tobacco businesses. 
:he cigarette industry is a g iant in the consu m er goods area. 
Jn 1986, the cigarette companies achieved oper ating profits 
of approximately five billion dollars, on sales of 20 billion 
dollars . Su ch pr ofit s are u n parall eled by most o th er 
:ndustries Ho wever, t he industry has been steeped in 
�ontroversy alm ost since its beginning in colonial America . 
7hdt controversy heated up in the 1950's, with the first of a 
��ries of reports associating cigarette smoking with various 
:. " ,1 l t h h a z a r d s S i n c e t h e 1 9 5 0 ' s , t he c iga r e t t e 
��nufacturers have pur sued div ersification strategies, in 
''':iponse to the threats to their original business, and a lso
�� d way to continue the growth that they had experienced in
• : · •• e a r l i e r pa r t o f t h e 2 0 t h c e n t u r y , a s t he c i g a re t t e ma r k e t
'. •· •, ◄• l ,�· p e d a n d g r e w • 
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9iversification 
in the indus try has been researched and
documented in the past
, in works such as Coffin Nails a nd
-2rporate Stra
tegies by Miles (49) 
� 
The Domestic Diversifying
b_t;guisition Decision by Dory (26), a nd The Tobacco Industry
,_11 __ Trans it ion , edited by Fin g e r ( 2 8 ) . These studies document
:he diversification of the "Big Six" cigarette ma nufacturers
:rom 1954 through 1979. (For a description of the Big Six, 
:,ce Table I) . However, s ome o f  the m ost si g nifi ca n t  
�ilestones in this on-going story have been reached in the 
'.980's. Philip Morris, the most successful of the Big Six 
::qarette manufacturers, became the last one to become "fully 
tiversified", when it a cqui red General Foods in 1985. In 
:,86, for the first time, Philip Morris' tobacco revenues 
•P:c less than fifty percent of total corporate revenues. In 
:135 we also saw the merger of R. J. Reynolds and Nabisco to 
!�rm RJR-Nabisc o, a n ot h e r majo r mil est o n e i n  t h e
:�versification story. 
: ;versification will undoubtedly continue in the future . 
" wever, the present time fram e p rovid es a n exc ellent 
; r rt unity to stop and ask the questions "How have Big Six 
'. :,,! with their diversif ication strategies? ... Have the Big 
. i  been able to apply the knowledge they gained in the 60' s 
. ;o•s to their diversification moves in the 80's?" . The 
•·•t ions can be approached in several different ways, using
qualitative and quantitative criteria. In both cases, 
. .  ,. ��dlysis is complicated by the large differences in the
- 2 -
succes ses of the Big Six within the cigarette industry . 
During the las t two decades, the Big Six hav e s eparated 
considerably in t erms of market share .  Philip Morris and 
Reynolds h ave essentially become the "Big Two" , with a 
comb ined market share of 69.2 percent (28, 47). This is 
contrasted with American and Liggett, with market shares of 7 
and 4 percent, respect ively. This large difference means 
that Philip Morris and Reynolds have h ad m uch more cash 
availab le to invest in non-tobacco interests than the others . 
It also means that Philip Morris and Reynolds did not have as 
nuch pressure to diversify out of cigarettes, and were able 
� o  take t he i r  t ime in s e le c t i ng a nd imp le m e n t i n g 
,! i v e rs i f i cation options . 
·.� n t h e s u r f a c e , i t w o u 1 d a p p e a r t h a t P h i 1 i p M o r r i s a n d
�cynolds are the most successful at divers ification. They 
:.,:,i<'. 12th and 14th, respect ively, on t he 1986 Fortune 500, 
,;, ! they fit most descri ptions of "blue chip" companies . 
.. w,•ver, it has been argued by some that Philip Morris and 
" ·:· :: � d s ha v e not been as s ucces sful as others, such as 
' -•·: : can Bran ds , i n  ut i lizing t oba cc o  profits fo r 
,,·:1i�ication (67). The operat ing margin of American's 
tacco businesses is higher than Philip M orris' and 
. i .1 f • 
:,•. •t ive success of the companies' strategies is analyzed 
�tudy by looking at the non-tobacco versus t obacco 
- 3 -
-:") 
financial data for each company, and by contrastin g the non­
tobacco financial data among the companies . Interpretation of
this data yields the answers to the question: how successful 
has each company b een outside the cigarette industry? 
rn order to put the analysis in perspective, it is necessary 
to review the c igare tte industry's development . It is 
especially important to look at the diversification decisions 
dnd results of the SO's, 60's and 70's, because they affected 
the decisions and results of the eighties . The next chapter 
9ives a brief historical perspective of the development of 
�he Big Six, and the ir diversification str a tegies . The 
: cader wh o i s  f ami l i a r  w it h  t h e  dev e l o pme n t  and 
!iversification h istory of the cigarette companies may wish
· �  �kip this chapter .
- 4 -
TABLE I 
THE BIG SIX CIGARETTE MANUFACTURERS 
COMPANY 
Philip Morris 
R. J. Reynolds 
Brown and Williamson 
Lorillard 
i\merican Tobacco 
:,iggett & Myers 
PERCENT SHARE CORPORATE ENTITY 
OF U.S. MARKE1 
(As of 12/86) l
)
36.B
32.4 
11.5 
8 . 1 
7.2 
4 • 0 
Philip Morris Companies 
RJR-Nabisco 
BATUS 
( 2)
(BAT Industries) 
Loews Corporation 
American Brands 
Liggett Group 
I ! ) 
Source: Maxwell, J. C. (47)
' ' ) 
·� Brown and Williamson Tobacco is a division of BATUS, which
-� a diversified, wholly owned subsidiary of BAT Industries,
;,eat Britain.
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CHAPTER II 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Early History of the Big Six Manufacturers 
The modern cigarette in d ustry began in the last half of the 
nineteen th cent ur y, whe n  t h e  cigare t te b e gan t o  ga i n 
populari ty as a tobacco smoking product, replacing snuff and 
pipe tobacco. The American Tobacco company was organized b y  
James "Buck" D uke of Durham County, North Carolina, in the 
: 8 9 0 I $ Duke absorbed sixteen small cigarette manufacturers, 
whic h included thre e of the m an uf acturers tha t  make up 
• day's "Big Six" (Reynolds, Lorill ard, Liggett & Myers).
:��e' s American Tobacco Company he ld a virtual monopoly in 
' �I! LJ. S • market. In 1902, American Tobacco merged with the 
:�porial Tobacco C ompany of Britain, to form the British-
i-�;1can Tobacco Company. The new company, led by Du ke , 
��rolled alm o s t  all the cigarette and tobacco pr oduct 
.:,1c:turing and distribution in the world (28). 
1, the U.S. Supreme c ourt forced Duke to bre ak up his 
The companies that emerged from the breakup were the 
,n Tobacco Company, Lorillard, R. J. Reynolds Tobacco, 
;qet t and Myers. B ritish-American Tobacco (BAT) was 
·· •·ra :-ated from American. It became a separate company, 
- 6 -
headquartered in England, with no U. S. manufacturin g  or 
sales. 
British-American stayed out of the United States market in 
the years following the breakup of the Duke trust, fearing 
reprisal from the U.S. anti-trust government forces. I n  
1927, BAT deci ded to enter t h e  U.S. tobacco market, by 
purchasing B rown and Williamson, a small s nuff and plug 
�anufacturer in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. Brown and 
Williamson entered the domestic ci garette mar ket in the 
: 9 3 0' s . 
i' ti i l i p Morris i s  the on 1 y on e o f the Big S ix wit h no 
:0nnection to the Duke empire. It was started in London in 
:s17 by Philip Morris, a tobacco merchant. He be gan to 
; �educe specialty ci garettes in small quantities in London, 
�nJ eventually began exporting to the United States. In 1919 
r.,. company was incorporated in the United States, to import 
;�rettes from England. It began production in the U. s.
:934, completing the ranks of the Big Six. 
;,:,••-tes continued to grow in popularity throughout the 
half of the twentieth cent ury becau s e  of their 
.... ,,;ence as opposed to chewing tobacco, snuff, and pipes. 
-�gy also played a major role in the development of the
;•:••· •,•• industry. The develop ment of filter cigarettes 
upward trend in per capita consumption in the 
- 7 -
fifties (S ee Figure I) Mac hin e r y  w as de v e l o p e d  to 
manufacture and package cigarettes at very high rates of 
speed, givin g manufacturers the capability to manufacture 
economically a consistent product at very high volumes. 
Figure I shows that, in spite of the controversy surrounding 
cigarettes, per capita consumption increased in the 197O's. 
It be gan a general dec l i n e  i n  1 9 8 2 . Po pu lat i o n  a n d  
demographic conditions have tended to smooth the effect of 
per-capita consumption on total industry s ales. T otal 
cigarette consumption shows an increasing trend through the 
1950' s, until 1982 (Figure II). T h is w as the year the 
federal Excise Tax was increased from 8 to 16 cents per pack. 
Since 1982, taxation, social acceptability, and health issues 
�dve caused annual decreases in total industry sales. 
:-� ... technology and complexity of distribution of cigarettes, 
�bined with the high cost of tobacco inventories, kept new 
�ranies from entering the cigarette business successfully. 
• ... " <.'nt rants were absorbed by one of the Big Six, or went out 
::�iness. The Big Six developed through the first half of 
twent i et h  century as a s i n gle-product oligop oly, 
-, •·'. ing only with each other, and f a c in g  fe w e xte r n al 
" · , � � e s ( 2 8 ) . Very little c h an ged in ter ms of the 
; ic.:,•:i' competitive standings in the thirties and forties.
r :� ' 
,:. Tobacco emerged as the powerhouse from the trust 
,1 :: cl h e 1 d t h i s p o s i t i o n i n t o t h e f i f t i e s . 
- 8 -
Philip 
.. _ .. 
., t• r, : 
Mo r r is r ema in e d  l o c k e d  into t h e  n u m b er six position 
throughout this period. See Table II. 
The Diversification Era 
In the mid-1950's things began to change for the industry. 
Cigarettes had begun to mature as a product, and the smoking­
health controversy began to heat up, with the publication of 
the Slo an-Kettering report in 1953. This report linked 
smoking with health hazards. It was followed by a seri es of 
Readers' Digest articles, and by the Surgeon General's report 
in 1964. Since that time, the cigarette companies have been 
face d with increasing threats to the legitimacy of their 
industry due to smoking and health and social acceptability 
issues, and increased taxation of their product (28). 
The Big Six responded to the external market forces in the 
1950's . Miles b reaks down the adaptation strategies of the 
industry into three different patterns, as shown in Table 
: I I . He classifie s these strategies as Domain Defense, 
: ,,main Creation, and Domain Offense (49). The Big Six worked 
'.0 intly in many respects to defend the legitimacy of their 
!<":ain, cigarettes. By forming and supporting organizations 
,�ch as the Tobacco Institute, they were able to function as 
., : . �ndustry to fight off the many threats a gainst t h e ir 
! UC t .
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FIGURE 1 
DOMESTIC PER-CAPITA CONSUMPTION OF CIGARETTES 
1950 - 1985 
Source: The Tobacco Inet1tute (721. 
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FIGURE 2 
ANNUAL DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION OF CIGARETTES 
1950 - 1985 
Source: The Tobacco Institute (72). 
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�he same time that the industry pulled together to defend 
. , the Big Six entered into a period of fierce 
with each other for market share . The period 
ifties to the eighties has been characterized by a 
)er of new produc t introductions, t o  address 
?references for "safer" cigarettes, such as filtered 
es, and low-tar, low-ni c otine cigarettes .  In 
n, the companies had to develop new marketing and 
sing mixes, as a result of the television advertising 
and the warning label requirements. The differences in 
cies of the companies to respond to these market changes 
lted in significant changes in their relative positions 
�he cigarette market. Philip Morris emerged from last 
,ce in 1950 to the undisputed leader in the early eighties. 
,erican fell from a commanding position in the industry, to 
1 very distant fifth place. 
Niles analyzed the domain offense s trategies of Philip 
Morris, American, Reynolds, and Liggett. He concluded that 
lnerican's decline was due to its assumption of a "defender" 
i .·: � " . American entered the fifties in a very solid position, 
•;:�. tt·,e top brands in the industry. However, it failed to
; t,, 
-? I .
,�:ze the need for innovation in the filtered and low-tar 
categories and saw the market share of its unfiltered 
1isappear in favor of the competition's filtered and 
:ands. Philip Morris, on the other hand, assumed 
�f a "prospector". As the smallest of the Big Six, 
- 12 -
it had little to lose and a lot to gain b y  a dop ting a 
strat eg y of ma rk e tin g  innovat i o n ,  wh ic h led to the 
intr o du c tion of su ccesses s u ch as Mar lbo r o  and Mer i t  
cigarettes . 
Miles characterized Reynolds as the "analyzer" . Reynolds 
worked on two levels: one in which it protected its share of 
the market, and another in which it analyzed emergi ng trends 
and competitor's products, and acted quickly to capitalize on 
any successful innovations by competitor s .  This strategy 
worked well for Reynolds, and it achieved and held the number 
one position in the industr y from 1950 until 1983, when 
Philip Morris replaced it. 
Liggett was classified by Miles as a "reactor" . Ligge tt 
failed to respond to the changes in the m arketplace, an d 
ended up losing market share throughout the fifties, sixties, 
,\ n d s e v e n t i e s . It di d not intr oduce a low-tar cigarette 
�=Hil 1977, fourteen years after Reynolds had introduced its 
'.:rst low tar brand.
: :. •? :.- e l a t i v e s u cc e s s e s o f t he B i g S i x du r i n g t h i s p e r i o d o f 
·=��sition is demonstrated in their respective market shares,
. , 1 hown in Table II . Since there was very little price 
�;ctition in the industry before the 1980's, this figure is 
I • 
a good indica tor of the increases in revenues of the 
-·.\:1.ies .
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7 :·. e "domain offe
nse" strategies of the Big Six affected their
::�crsification strategies As Reynolds and Philip Morris
: ,. q d n t O p u 11 away f r o m t h e pa c k , di v e r s i f i c a t i o n be c am e a 
:.�:cssity for companies such as American, L igge tt, and 
: ;I lard. They were seeing their cigarette volume going to
, •:lip Morris and Reynolds, yet they were still accumulating 
.1 .,t, which could be reinvested in other businesses . As we 
see later, American was able to put together a strategy 
:emain in control of i ts future . Liggett and Lorillard 
victims of acquisitions by industry outsiders 
- 14 -
. ; 
TABLE II 
DOMESTIC MARKET SHARE OF THE BIG SIX
YEAR RJR PM B & w AMER. LOR. L & M OTHERS 
1911 3 7. 1 15.3 27.8 19.8 
1913 0.2 35.3 22.1 34.1 9. 3
1925 4 1 . 6 0 . 5 21. 2 1 . 9 2 6 . 6 8.2
1930 28.6 0 . 4 0. 2 37.6 6 . 9 25.0 1 . 5
1939 2 3. 7 7 . 1 10.6 23.5 5 . 8 2 1 . 6 7. 8
1940 21.7 9. 6 7 . 8 2 9. 5 5 . 4 20.6 5 . 4
1949 26.3 9 . 2 5. 9 31. 3 5. 0 20.2 2 . 1
1955 25.8 8 . 5 10.5 32.9 6 . 1 15. 6
1960 32.1 9 . 4 10.4 2 6. 1 1 0 . 6 11.3
1965 32.6 10.5 13.3 25.7 9. 2 8 . 7 
1970 31.8 1 6. 8 1 6 . 9 19 . 3 8 . 7 6.5 
19 7 1 31 . 8 18.2 1 6 . 8 1 7. 8 9.2 6. 2
1972 31. 4 20.0 17.3 1 6 . 8 8 . 9 5.6
1973 31.3 21 . 8 1 7 . 6 15.7 8 . 4 5. 1
1974 31.5 23.0 17.5 1 5 . 0 8.2 4 . 7
1975 32.5 23.8 17.0 1 4 . 2 7.9 4. 4
1976 33.2 25.2 16.5 13.4 7 . 8 3 . 9
1977 33.1 26.7 15.8 12.3 8. 7 3 . 6
1978 32.9 27.9 15.3 11. 6 9 . 0 3.2
1979 32.7 2 9 . 0 14 . 5 11.5 9 . 6 2.7
1980 32.8 30.8 13.7 1 0. 7 9 . 8 2.2
1981 33. 0 31.8 14. 0 9. 5 9. 2 2.5
1982 33.4 32.8 13.3 8. 9 8 . 7 2 . 9
1983 31.5 34.4 11.5 8. 6 9. 2 4 . 8
1984 31 . 6 35.3 11 . 3 8.2 7 . 9 5.7
1985 31.6 35.9 1 1 . 9 8. 1 7. 5 5.0
1986 32.4 36.8 11. 5 8 . 1 7. 2 4 . 0
:.,'.gend:
,_ • ?, = R. J. Reynolds AMER. = American 
: �- � Philip Morris LOR. = Lorillard 
" � w = Brown and Williamson L & M = Liggett and Myers 
- 15 -
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TABLE III 
PATTERNS OF STRATEGIC ADAPTATION AMONG THE BIG SIX 
ADAPTIVE 
MODES 
Domain 
Defense 
Domain 
Offense 
Domain 
Creation 
GOALS STRATEGIES 
Preservation of Creation and control 
legitimacy and of vital information 
autonomy of 
traditional domain Lobbying and coopting 
(LEGITIMACY) institutional 
gatekeepers 
Enhancement of Product inovation 
economic 
performance in Market segmentation 
traditional 
domain 
(EFFICIENCY) 
Creation of new Diversification 
performance 
opportunities; Overseas expansion 
minimization of 
risk exposure 
(GROWTH & SECURITY) 
REFERENT 
DOMAIN 
Traditional 
product/ 
market 
Traditional 
product/ 
market 
New products 
& markets 
Source: Miles, Coffin Nails and Corporate Strategies, (49, pg. 51). 
TARGET 
Agents in the 
institutional 
environment 
surrounding the 
traditional 
product/market 
Rivals for the 
traditional 
product/market 
Rivals for the new 
products/markets 
RELATIONS AMONG 
TRADITIONAL 
COMPETITORS 
Cooperative 
Competitive 
Independent 
CHAPTER III 
DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGIES 
Background
Before a nalyzing the 
diver si fic ation st rategies of the 
Big
Six, it is impor t an t to
 review the backgrou nd for t he
�evelopment of modern-day conglomerate corporations. The Big
2 ix are at ypi cal comp an ie
s, from the standpoint that they
1rew to ver y large sizes as
 si ngle-produc t compan ies in an
:igopoly. However, from a more general viewpoint , they were
;�rt of the over all development of modern-day corporations,
,�.ct t.here is very li t tl e  doubt that t hey would have
'.:versifie d  whe the r there ha d been a smoking-health 
'.: '. . rovers y or not . 
•��:ican business has seen th ree waves of merger and
·•·:�ification in the twentieth century (49, 2J)
:ded with an expansion period in the economy.
·i ... se occurred during t he period 1898 to l 9 0 2
Each wave 
The f i rs t  
This was 
:,, the days of anti-trust legi slation , and Miles refers
'� period as "m erging for monopoly" c49). It was during
:",iod that many corporations were able to establish
�· "' Ve S as major forc e s  in their Product l i n e , by
:.� other companies. Duke Was abl e to consolidate his
- 17 -
tobacco empire during this time, absorbing sixteen o ther
companies along the way.
7he second wave of merger and acquisition occurred during
:925-1931 . Miles c a lls this p eriod as "mergin g for 
:ll igopoly". During th i s  pe riod, companies ten d e d  to 
·insolidate their positions through vertical and horizontal
:�tegration of their product lines. 
� third wave described by Mi les is the period 1955-1970. 
w :es refers t o  thi s peri od as 0 merg ing for growt h" .
�panies which h ad established themselves in a particular 
.,:ness line had to look for growth opportunities elsewhere, 
·ause an ti-t rust legislation kept them from acquiring
-"·-:t competitors, or the growth oportunities in their own 
':••:ts had slowed down. It w as during this third wave that 
'bacco com panies develop ed their strategies and beg an 
hversification programs. As we sh all see, some of the 
• x rut together formal diversification programs in the
while others tended to resist major diversification 
il well into the 1960's. 
'.: i ch sen revie wed the development of diversified
1 tQ firms from 1920-1970 in the Business History 
·i • He refers to three stages of corporate growth: 
1 ge r" 
·,:ngle
firm is 
product 
the informally 
company. The 
- 18 -
organized, 
"Stage II" 
single 
firm is 
.. 
. .. 
, .. 
~ •· : 
functionally organized and integr ated, and produces a 
sin g le produ ct line . The "St age III" firm is the 
diversified, multidivisional company. Scott's thesis is 
th at as firms grow and mature they ten d  to move from 
Stage I through II and into III. 
The diversifed firm is specifically distinguished from 
the integrated firmn by a pattern of direct transactions 
bet ween t he product market sub-units and the market 
place . In the fully integrated firm on ly t h e  l ast 
subun it in the production chain offers the finished 
product for sale (23, pp. 205-206) 
By the 1950's, all of the Big Six had progressed from Stage I 
to Stage II, and were ready to progress into Stage III. 
General Diversification Strategies 
J1drichsen identifies four general diversification strategies 
!Jllowed by f irms since the 1920's . They are internal 
'.•"Jelopment, acquired technology, homogeneous markets, and 
·::qlomerate strategies.
�ernal development usually involves little or no detailed 
•·, term planning. Growth essentially comes through throw-
::• from internal research activities which lead the company 
new product areas. Didrichsen uses Dupont as an example 
1 :ompany that "developed an extens ive competence in a 
technology through internal development". 
•=ect tec hnology is a str ategy by which comp a n ie s 
: • :fy through acq uisition of compan ies which can 
-··�.ent their technology. Compan ies fo llo w in g  this 
- 19 -
strategy will ususally diversify by acquiring companies in a 
related product line, with a technology base that complements 
the ac quirer' s te chnology. An example of this is White 
consolidated Industries, which expanded in the 1950' s from a 
sewing machine company into industrial machinery and consumer 
appliances, by acquiring a number of companies in th ose 
product lines. 
Homogeneous market strategies involve diversification by 
acquisition of companies with product lines that utilize 
similar channels of distribution. The key ingredient in this 
strategy is a similarity in marketing and sales skills needed 
to market the acquired company's product li nes . As we shall 
se e later , Am er i c a n  To b a cc o  u ti lized this strategy 
extensively as it diversified into consumer products with 
"istribution systems similar to cigarettes . 
-�mpanies using conglomerate strate gies ex tend t h e i r
1 :tivities into unrelated product areas, for defensive or
!�ensive reasons . A key reason for this type of strategy is
spread risk among several industry and product categories.
�panies utilizing this strategy usually organize into a
lding company" structure, with relatively autonomous sub-
3 reporting to a corporate unit. A classic example of 
. -� strategy is ITT, which went into numerous unrelated
:�esse s in t he sixties ,  in cl uding commun i ca tions, 
. ' t• . : �s, and financial services. 
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Diversification Strategies of the Big Six 
The Big Six utilized all of the strategies outlined above at 
different times during their diversification histori es . In 
the next chapter, we will see how these strategies, developed 
and implemented in the 1950's 60's and ?O's, impacte d the 
corporations we have in the 80's . In the following sections, 
we will look at how each of the Big Six institute d its own 
diversification strategy, and how it entered the eighties. We 
will see that two of the Big Six d idn't make it into the 
�ighties as co nglomerate s Lig gett and Lorillard were 
Jbsorbed along the way. We will also see how Philip Morris, 
��erican, and Rey nol d s  applied their own diversification 
;· � i 1 o s op hi e s , 1 e a r n e d f r o m m i s t a k e s a 1 o n g t h e w a y , a n d 
p�erged into the 80's as conglomerate corporations. 
R. J. REYNOLDS 
1954 - 1979 
•p,��lds began its diversification in the late 1950's with an
· �rnal development move . It had previously set up its 
··· Aluminum division in a vertical integration step, to
foil for its packaging operations . As its first step 
:.��rsification, it expanded the Archer division to supply 
meet the gr owing deman d for consumer packaging and 
materials .
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Re ynolds approached diversif ica tion in a very formal an d 
systematic manner. It organized a d iversification task force 
which eval uate d  potential acquisitions, and dev eloped a 
formal set of diversification targets an d criteria for t h e 
corporat ion. The primary goal of its d i versification 
strategy was profit protection (49) 
In the 1960's Reynolds began its major diversification moves, 
with pur chases of several consumer go ods companies It 
purchased Pacific Hawai ian Products, makers of Hawaiian 
Punch, in 1963. This purchase was followed in 1966 by the 
purchases of Penick and Ford, Chun King, and Filler Products, 
Inc., all food-related businesses. Nineteen sixty-sev e n  was 
anot her major acquisition year, with the purchases of Patio 
Foods, Coronation Foods, and Filmco. Fi lmco was purchased as 
an extension of the foil business of the Archer Division. 
7hroughou t t h e first pa rt of the s ixties, Re ynolds' 
Jcquisitions we re minor compared to its investments in 
-�nufacturing capacity for its filter cigarettes. Reynold s 
�Jd be com e t h e  number one cigarette manufacturer in the 
·�.ited States, and was making inv estments to protect that
1 ition. In the late 1960's the strategy changed. Reynolds 
"',an to invest towards expansion of its international 
-qarette business, and it also began to make v ery major
��stments in unrelated industries.
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The first unrel ated inv estment came in 1969, with the 
pur ch ase of McLe a n  In dust ries McL e an was in t he 
transpo rt a tion industry, and was owner of Se a-Land, the 
largest containerized sea-freig ht service in the world. 
Reynolds saw this investment as an opportunity to get in on a 
new industry with high growth potential. 
The purchase of McLean made the non-tobacco businesses a 
significant share of corporate revenues . I n  1969 Reynolds 
acknowledged this fa ct by ch a nging its na me from R .  J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Company to R. J. Reynolds Industries. 
Reynolds continued the conglomerate diversification strategy 
in the 70's. It purchased American Independent Oil Co m pany 
(AMINOIL) i n  1970. 
AMINOIL was two-fold. 
The reasoning behind the purchase of 
First, Reynolds was looking for growth 
opportunities in the energy industry, and it also was looking 
for a stable suppl y of oil for its shipping subsidiary, Sea­
Land. 
The implementation of Reyno lds' diver s ifi c a t ion in the 
sixties and early seventies cre ated some uneasiness in the 
stockholders' minds . The company had no t o nly used the 
�esources pr ovided by tobacco, but had also incurred a hig h  
debt ($ 100 million in 1971) t o  p ay for the McLean and 
;MINOIL pu rchase s .  The ventures into unrelated businesses
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did not go very well at the beginning, as reported by Finger 
( 2 8) : 
None of the food subsidiaries had a nationally leading 
brand name, making the promotion job tougher and cutting 
into profits signi ficantly. A major dock strike in 1971 
crip p led Sea-Land, and the b locked purchase of U.S. 
Lines thwarted the company's long range plans. AMINOIL 
did not p rod uce stellar earnings fig ures either. And 
Reynolds' share of the domestic cigarette market slipped 
slightly, from 31.8 percent in 1970 to 31.5 percent in 
197 4. 
These woes p r ompted some mutinous g rousi n g s f rom 
Reynolds' largest block of stockholders, the Reynolds 
family. As quoted in Forbes, one family member snapped, 
"Look, these guys are the world's best at marketing and 
selling tobacco products, b ut what do they know about 
ships or oil?" 
-,. of this dissati s fac tion was add ressed when a new 
,·31ement team took over in 1973. This team was le d b y  
--� Stokes, who had come up through the company's tobacco 
-�ess, a nd would h opeful ly turn back the slide i n
•:••tte market sh are . Howeve r, Paul Sticht, a vice-
• · - !••nt who had a non-tobacco marketing background, became
•erful force in the company. He became chairman in 
'�� for the first time in the history of the company a 
=�cco person was in charge of the corporation. Sticht 
•· •":! an aggressive program to pump tobacco profits into
-1 ::y' s other subsidiaries. 
�Jde one more major purchase in the 70's. In 1979 
1 iect del Monte (a can ned fruit and v egetab le 
!or 618 million dollars, and b egan p lans to
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con s olidated all its fo od product operations under one 
subsidiary, RJR Foods. Del Monte represented a retrenchment 
back into more familiar consumer product lines. 
As the 70's closed out, the verdict was still ve ry much in 
doubt on the success of Reynolds' diversification strategy. 
The acquired businesses had pe rformed at lower levels than 
anticipated, and the cigarette business was steadily losing 
market share to Philip Morris. 
Cigarett es were s till Reynolds' most profitable produ ct 
however, and as the 1970's ended Reynolds reaffirmed its 
commitment to this business by announcing a one billion 
dollar expansi on program for its cigarette operations, to 
support domestic and international markets. 
1979 - 1987 
... 1984, Reynolds sold its energy businesses, and began its 
··:e to consolidate its markets into consume r product lines.
�� acquisition of Nabisco foods in 1985 was a major step in 
�ieving this objective. 
� Purchase of Nabisco resulted in the first year in which 
=-·tobacco sales exceeded tobacco sales. To highlight this
·: .. ct, the company changed its name to RJR-Nabisco. In its
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1985 annual report, the company's man agement stated its 
diversification objectives as follows: 
1. Achiev ing a more balanced portfol io, from a profit
contribution perspective.
2. Protecting 
po s i ti on 
industry.
and enhancing the corporation's competitive
i n  t h e  consolidating food and bever age
3. Securing new sources of business growth.
4. Achieving an international presence.
5. Enhancing management depth.
To achieve these objectives, the company made a series of 
divestitures and consol idations after th e p urc hase of 
Nabisco . RJR-Nab isco sold off its i n ter ests i n  t h e  
restaurant and food services industries when it sold Kentucky 
Fried Chicken and Service Systems Corporation. It also sold 
che Skolnik Bagel Bakeri es and Dental C ar e  of Amer ica 
subsidiaries. And, in a major divestiture move, RJR-Nabisco 
3old off its wine and spirits subsidiary, Heublein, for 1.2 
illion dollars in 1987. 
-:R-Nabisco also made consolidation moves in the tobacco 
-�1ustry, when it sold most of its chewing tobacco brands and
:.scontinued sales of the others This left RJR-Nabisco's 
��stic tobacco operations w ith only c igaret tes and small 
· :arillos.
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In the food business, RJR-Nabisco combined the operations of 
Del Monte and Nabisco, in order to take advantage of the 
synergies between the two companies. 
The merger of RJR and Nabisco also brought major changes in 
the management structure of R. J.Reynolds. F. Ross Johnson, 
the chairman of Nabisco, became chief executive officer of 
RJR-Nabisco soon after the acquisition of Nabisco by R .  J. 
Reynolds. Within three weeks of assuming the position, Mr .
Johnson announced the relocation of corporate headquarters 
from Winston-Salem to Atlanta. Part of the reason for the 
move was to distance the corporate headquarters from the 
tobacco-centered activities in Winston-Salem, that is, to 
emphasize the diversified nature of the new RJR-Nabisco (74). 
In addition, the move was combined with a reduction in 
corporate staff from 1,000 to 300, a further move towards 
str e amlining and consolidation of the company. With the 
merger, RJR-Nabisco has become a true conglomerate, led by a 
non-tobacco chief executive (43). 
PHILIP MORRIS 
1954 - 1979 
'�ilip Morris was committed to domain offense more than any
:her of the Big six and aggressively pursued cigarette 
-�rket shares in the U . S .  an d m arket o p p or t u n iti es
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i nternationally. The growth of its ci garette business, 
beginning in 1955, kept Philip Morris' attention focused on 
facility expansions and marketing efforts domestically and 
internationally. 
However, success in cigarettes did not make Philip Morris 
lose si g h t  of the o p po r tu nities a n d  t h e  n e e d  f o r 
diversification. It set up a corporate planning department 
in the ear ly 1960's and continued a stead y strategy of 
acquisi tion and expansio n ,  usi ng cash generated by the 
tobacco business (26). In 1960, Philip Morris purchased the 
American Safety Razor Company. This was the beginning of a 
�ore planned strategy, in which Philip Morris was interested 
in product lines with similar marketing and distribution 
�ystems, and low per-unit costs. American Safety Razor was 
:ollowed by the acquisitions of Burma Shave and Clark Gum in 
:963 (28) 
... the 50's and ear ly 60's Philip Morris' acquisitions were 
'-=cost insignifi cant in relation to its tobacco business.
1.n 1968, Philip Morris made a major move by purchasing 
Percent of the M i ller B rew i ng Company . In 1970 it 
-=:hased the remaining 47 percent, to make Mi ller a wholly
• - "i subsidiary. 
. •  '! t met most of Phili p Morris' criteria for acquisition.
· '
1 d a l O w m a r k e t s h a r e i n a l a r g e m a r k e t , a n d h a d
- 28 -
potential for the type of growth Philip Morris desired. 
Philip Morris immediatel y  began t o  po ur resou rce s into 
Miller, in the form of marketing management skills and cash 
to build new breweries. By the end of the 1970's, Miller had 
gone from nu mber seven to number two in the beer industry 
( 2 8) 
Philip M or ris continued its expansion in the seventies. In 
1970 it purchased Mission Viejo, a real estate development 
company in the west. Mission Viejo represented a business 
line totally unrelated to the company's other businesses, and 
was purc hased strictly as a financial investment. 
In 1970 P hilip Morris also b o ug h t  Plainwe ll Paper and 
Armstrong Products. These two companies were rolled into the 
Industri al division, which already included Nic olet and 
Milprint. In 1971, it purchased Lindema n Holdings, an 
Australian wine company. Wisconsin Tissue Mills was added to 
the Industrial division in 1977. 
l\nother major acqu isition was made in 1978, w hen Seven-Up
company was purchased. seven-up was the third leading soft-
hink company in t he United States, and also included some 
�OOd subsidiaries and an international division. Philip 
�
0
tris hoped to have the same success with Seven-Up that it
. 'l. d With Miller, making it into a direct contender with 
::-idustry leaders Pep si and Coca-Cola Philip Mo rris 
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. 
immediately began to pour the marketing and capital resources 
into Seven-Up, but, as we shall see later, the marke tin g 
magic did not rub off on Seven-Up (25) 
By the end of the 70's, Philip Morris had developed into a 
major force in the cigarette industry, threatening Reynolds 
for the number one spot domestically. More significantly, it 
had mad e  a se c u re place for itself in the international 
cigarette market, expanding through acquisitions, licensing 
agreements, and new manufacturing facilities into more than 
140 countries. The international division had been made into 
a free-standing subsidiary, a counterpart to Philip Morris 
U.S.A. 
At the cl ose o f  th e  1970' s Philip M orri s  In corporated 
consisted of six operating compa nies: Philip Horris USA,
Philip Morris International, Miller Brewing Company, Seven­
'Jp, Philip Morris Ind ustrial, and Mis s ion Viejo . Philip 
�orris had learned some important lessons along the way. Its 
�lark Gum and American Safety Razor acquisitions failed to 
-�et the company's growth and profit expectations and were
:: ·:ested. Miller Brewing, a great marketing success of the 
�, had not come close to making a return on the investment 
·,.it Philip Morris had made. So, Philip Morris entered the 
· s as a successful, diversified company, but still relying 
":;;helmingly on profits from cigarettes for its earnings. 
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1979 - 1987
In 1986, Philip Mo r ri s  r e ache d a mile s tone in it s 
diversificat ion history. For the first time, revenues from 
tobacco were less than half of corporat e revenu es, althou gh 
tobacco still dominate d  the profit pictur e, with almost 75 
percent of operating income coming from tobacco (54). 
The early 1980' s were relatively st able y ears for Philip 
Morris in terms of diversification. The company invested its 
money and management resources in trying to spur the growth 
0£ Miller Brewing and the newly acquired Seven-Up company. In 
addition, it invested he avily to support its growth in the 
domestic and international ci garette businesses. However, by 
the end of 1984 it was clear that growth in the beer market 
would be difficult to achieve, and that success in the soft 
drink market would also be very difficult. Philip Morris, 
although dominant in the cigar ette market, had run into 
:ormidable competition from Anheuser-Busch, Pepsi, and Coca-
;'.o la. 
:n 1985 and 1986 Philip Morris made a series of divestitures 
I:) d acqui s i t ions , a nd emerg ed a s  a mul t i-c o mp a ny 
:onglomerate, with 1986 revenues being almost double the 1984
: •�venues . The company reverted back to its strengths in
�lrketing consumer products, by selling
 off most of its
' ' ' 1 . 
·• lp Morris Industrial units, 
including Wisconsin Tissue
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· l t P and Plai'nwell Pa
per.
Mills, Nico e aper, 
The industrial 
unit had always been a mi
nor portion of corporate 
reve nues
) and di'd not fit in with 
the company's
(less than 10 percent , 
business plans. 
The div estiture of Philip Morri s Industrial was followed 
closely by the largest acquisition in Philip Morris h isto ry, 
and one of t he largest corporate mergers o n  record. In 
acquiring the General Foods Corporation, Philip Morris almost 
doubled in size (as measured by sales re venues). General
Foods was purchased for 6.5 billion dollars in November of 
1985, shortly after the merger of Nabisco-R, J. Reynolds. 
Only a few months after the Ge neral Foods merger, Philip 
Morris announced the sale of the Seven-Up company. Seven-up 
had n ot been able to strengthen its third-place position in
the soft drink i'ndustry, d · 
· · · 
a n  in fact had been slipping in 
market share compared to Coke, Pepsi, and Dr . Pepp er . In 
additi on, it h d b a een unable to position a cola drink in the 
market to compete ff e ectively with the much larger Coke and
Pep3 i.
Ninet een eigh ty six was a consolid ation far Philip year 
Morris ' as the General Foods subsidiary was absorbed into the
Phil' ip Morris family of companies. Shortly before acquiring 
Foods, 
Company structure.
Philip Morris had reorganized into a holding
The following companies were set up as
G~net:al 
su b sidiaries u nder t h e paren t  Philip Morris Companies 
Incorporated: 
Philip Morris USA (Tobacco ) 
Philip Morris International (Tobacco, wine)
Miller Brewing Company 
General Foods Corporation 
Mission Viejo (Real Estate Development)
Philip Morris Cred it Corporation (Financial Services)
AMERICAN 
1954 - 1979 
American Tobacco began as the original major tobacco company, 
the corporate parent of the James Duke tobacco trust. Yet, 
it finished the 1970's as the most diversified of the big six 
that survived as corporate entities. Sin ce 1911, whe n the 
Duke trust was broken up, American was the industry leader in 
the dome stic cigarette market. Perhaps because of i t s  
domi nant position, it failed to recognize the need to change 
when the market demanded filtered and low tar cigarettes. 
The dec line of American's cigarette market began in the mid­
fifties, when companies like Reynolds and Phi lip M or ris 
introduced filter cigarettes. American failed to jump on the 
bandwagon, and by 1958 Reynolds had replaced it as the number 
o n e  cig arette manufacturer. American essential ly slept 
through the 1950's a nd ear ly 60's. In 1964 it was st i l l  
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relying on non-filter cigarettes for the bulk of its sales, 
and had not made any significant diversification moves. 
New management recognized the problems in 1964, and responded 
on both the domain offense and domain creation fronts. They 
instituted a series of new cigarette brand introductions in 
the filter and low-tar categories. It was during this period 
that Carlton cigarettes were introduced, now one of the most 
successful low-tar cigarettes. In 1966 and 67, the company 
went on a buying spree, purchasing Sunshine Biscuits, James 
Beam Distilling, Swingline S tapler, Acme Visible Records, 
Master Lock, Duf f-Mott (applesauce), and Andrew Jergens 
(personal care products) (28). 
T he basic t h r us t  of A m e ri c a n' s  l a t e but aggr es s i ve 
diversification was in consumer products, requirin g heavy 
marketing. Unlike Philip Morris and Reynolds, American did 
not venture far from the basic distribution and m arketing 
stre ngths it h a d  in the ciga rette business. In 1969, 
American affirmed its status as a diversified corporation by 
changing its name from American Tobacco to American Brands. 
Two major non-tobacco acquisitions followed in the 1970's. In 
1973, America n  b ought A cushnet Company, and in 1979 it 
completed the acquisition of the Franklin Life Insur a nce 
Company. The insurance company acquisition was its first
move from consumer products, and it proved very successful. 
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In its first year as a wholly owned subsidiary it, provided 
100 million dollars in income to the parent company. 
Like Philip Morris, American elected to expand its domain in 
the cigarette business through international expansion. In 
1968 it bought a 75 percent interest in Gallaher Limited, 
Britain's second largest cigarette manufacturer. It obtained 
full ownership of Gallaher in 1975. The Gallaher acquisition 
gave American an international presence, with the opportunity 
to use the distribution and marketing resources for other
consumer products, and for the export of domestic cigarettes.
The Galla her subsidiary itself became a diversified company,
with 25 percent of its prof1.' ts · f coming rom non-tobacc o
businesses by the end of the 1970's. 
American's strategy in the 1970' s appeared to be one of pu re
diversific ation away from cigarettes. It was putting little
investment back into the cigar tt b e e us1.ness, and introducing
f ew n ew b r ands. In the mean time it was utilizing its
tobacco-generated cash to support and expand its
b usinesses. Its share of the domestic cigarette market went
non-tobacco
from 32.9 percent in
11.6 percent 
sales income 
in 1979.
195 5 to 14. 2 Percent in
was coming
197 5, 
domestic producer.
By 1975, th e majority of its cigarette
from the Gallaher subsidiary, not the
and to 
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1979 - 1987 
American ha s cont i n ued the diversific a tion strate gy 
formulated in th e la te 60' s and earl y 70' s .  In 1979, 
Americ an Brands consisted o f  the following divisions 'and 
subsidiaries: 
The American Tobacco Company 
American Cigar 
Gallaher Limited 
Franklin Life Insurance Company 
Master Lock Company 
Wilson Jones Company 
Swingline Incorporated 
Sunshine Bis cuits 
Acushnet 
The Andrew J ergens Company 
Acme Visible Records 
W. R. Case & Sons Cutlery 
Duffy-Mott Company Inc. 
American T ob a c co and A merican C i g a r  wer e o p er a t e d  a s  
divisions of American Brands, whereas the other companies 
were subsidiaries. 
By 1979, American ha d ali g ned itself around four "core 
busine sses", which included dome stic toba c co, fi nanc ial 
services, domestic manufacturing, and international products 
through the Gallaher subsidiary (3). In the ma nuf acturin g 
sector, American continued to concentrate on manufacturing of 
high-volum e packaged products, with low per-unit prices . It 
is int eresting to note that American did not identify one of 
its core businesses as food p roducts, a lthough i t had 
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Sunshine Biscuits and Duffy-Mott in its family of companies. 
Ap parently its long-term strategy was to bec ome a true 
conglomerate, with no c lose corporate identification with a 
specific product. This "acquisitive conglomerate" strategy 
became more evident by 1986. In its 1986 annual report, 
American describes itself as a "broad-based worldwide holding 
comp any strongly positioned in two core businesses, packaged 
consumer goo ds, and financial s ervices." Th e cor po rate 
identification with tobacco had completely disappeared. In 
October 1987, Americ a n  s o ld off the Sunsh i ne Biscu its 
subsidiary. 
Edward Whittemore, who replaced Mr. Robert Heimann as chief 
executive officer i n  1980, h as been the chief architect of 
American's diversification strategy in th e 1980' s. M r. 
Whittemore came from the company's Wilson Jones subsidiary, 
and under his leadership American has distanced itself even 
more from the "tobacco company" image (30) In January 1986, 
the company changed to a holding c ompany structure, making 
American Tob acco a sub sidiary company, as opposed to a 
division of the corporation. 
American has made the following m ajor acquisitions sinc e 
1979: 
1981: Purchased Offrex, a Bri tish office products 
company, through British subsidiary Gallaher. 
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1983: Purchas ed Pinkerton's, a major sec urity a nd 
1 9 8 4 : 
1 9 8 5 : 
1986: 
investigations firm. 
Gallaher acquired the 
Sp ain, and Eastlight 
largest optical company in 
Limited, a British off ice 
supplies company. 
Franklin Life Insurance acquired Southland Life 
Insurance Company. 
Gallaher acquired T h e  Prestige Group, PLC, a 
manufacturer of houseware products in the United 
Kingdom. 
Ac u shne t  a cquired Foot-Joy Incorpora ted , a 
manufac tur er of sp orts footwear and gloves. 
Mas t er Loc k acquire d Dext er Lock Company, 
manufacturer of door lock sets and door hardware. 
Acqu i red B on ny Pro d u c t s, 
manufacturer of kitchen 
the hardware group. 
Pinkerton's acqu ired 
utensils, 
I n c or p o r a t e d ,
and ad ded it to 
BASIX Con trol s Systems 
Corporation, a business specializing in security 
systems. 
1987: Acquired ACCO Worl d, office sup ply c ompany. 
James Beam acquired the distilled spirits business 
of National Distillers and Chemical Corporation. 
As shown above, American's strategy in the 1980's has been to 
bu ild up th e business lines that it established in the first 
fourteen years of its diversification program (1966-1979). In 
mos t  cases, a cquisitions were made by the subsidiary 
companies, a nd were mad e for t he purp ose of i ncrea sin g  
American's presence in the given markets. Throughout its 
history of diversification, American's approach has been to 
acquir e companies f o r  growth and investment value. Its
mana gement strategy has been to leave existing management in
place and allow the subsidiaries to function independently as
long as the income growth meets corporate requirements.
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American has pursu e d  internat ional as well a s  domestic 
diversificat i on. Its Galla her subsidia ry i s  itsel f a 
diversified company, with interests in optical products, food 
products, an d  liquor as well a s  its trad i t i onal tobacco 
business. Gallaher's acquisitions have tended to follow the 
sa m e  general trend a s  i ts pa rent company, with m ajor 
acquisitions in office products, housewares and hardware, and 
optical products. 
American's domestic tobacco businesses have be en on a steady 
decline through the 1980's. However, profits from domestic 
ci ga r ette sales ha ve r emained very healthy, and the company 
has been unwilling to totally abandon its cigarette business. 
In 1982, American re-introduced its Lucky Strikes brand, in a 
filter ed version. The brand has enjoyed a mild success, 
thanks to its well-recognized name. The re-introduction of 
Lucki es has helped American slow down the erosion of its 
cigarette market shares (30). But in 1983 American slipped 
be l ow Lo ril lar d in t h e r a nkin gs o f  t h e  "Bi g Six" 
manufacturers, to fifth place. 
American's commitment to tobacco did not extend into the 
ci gar business. In July of 1986, American sold its American
Cigar s ubsidiary, stating in its 1986 annual report t hat the 
cigar business did ·not "fit long term strategic growth plans" 
( 5) 
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Unlike American' s domestic cigarette business, its foreign 
cigarette sales continued a pattern of slow growth in spite 
formidable o bstacles posed by a declining, and tax burdened 
British market Gallaher' s cigarette volume increased in 
1986, despite a three percent decrea se in British market 
volume. Its share of the British cigarette market was 35 
percent in 1986, second in the industry. Gallaher is also 
well poised for cigarette sales volume growth in European and 
Middle East markets. 
American today is a totally different corporation than the 
tobacco giant of the thirties and forties. Its story differs 
considerably from any of the other Big Six. Unlike Philip 
Mor r is an d Reyn o lds ,  it has perfo rmed poo rly in its 
tradition al cigar et t e  business, mi ssi ng key m a rket i ng 
opportunities along the way. However, unlike Liggett and 
Lorillard, it has been able to control its own destiny and 
has emerged as a leading multinational consumer products and 
financial services company. Its strategy of diversification 
th rough acquisition o f  smaller companies has wo rked well 
through the years. Since 1966, American has invested more 
than three billion dollars in diversifying acquisitions (5). 
Even after its twenty-year diversification process, Ameri can 
stil l owes most of its income to tobacco . In 1986, 61 
percent of sales and 59 percent of operating profits came 
from tobacco (5) All indications are that American will
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continue its pattern of acquisitions, to further dilut e its 
reliance on toba cco products. In 1986 it attempted a major 
expansion by bidding for the Cheeseborough-Ponds compdny. 
However, it was defeated by Unilever, which offered more for 
Cheeseborough-Ponds. In 1987, American acquired ACCO World, 
an offi ce pro d ucts company, which wi ll almost dou ble 
American's size in this market (37). 
LORILLARD 
1954 - 1979 
Like American, Lo rillard failed to react effectively to 
market changes in the 1950's. American was able to recover 
and instit u t e  an aggressive diversifi cation strategy. 
Lorillard was not so lucky. It m a de s ome attempts a t  
diversifi cati on in the 1960' s, by purch asing a pet food 
company and two candy companies. But, the execution of its 
diversificati o n  a ttempts was poor, and in 1967 its non­
tobacco businesses accounted for only five percent of total 
sales Lorillard's cash flow and small size compare d to the 
other Big Six made it a good takeover candi date. 
Laurence Tisch's Loews Theatres absorbed Lorillard. 
In 1968, 
At that 
time Loews wa s a 137 million dollar per year comp any, and 
Lorillard w as a 567 million dollar per year company. Tisch 
changed the name of the company from Loews The atres to the 
I.uews Corµoration the following year, and immediately set
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abo ut to lo o k  fo r inv e stment op po rtunities from t h e  
Lorillard-generated cash . 
Tisch applied Lorillard' s cash flo w  towards expansi on of 
Loews' hotel business, but his primary interests were in 
stock market activities. He utilized the cash in a string of 
unsuccessful acquisition attempts, including Goodrich, RCA,
Franklin Natio na l Bank, Gimbel' s Department Stores, and 
Talcott National Corporation . 
Lo ews protected its c ash-generating subsid iary . Tisc h 
bro ught in new management for Lorillard, i ncluding a new 
chairman, Curtis Judge, who had been a Reyn o l ds Vice-
President Judge st reaml ined the c ompany' s marketing 
functions, upgraded the manuf acturing facilities, and was 
able to increase cigarette volume by 25 percent in the last 
half of the 1970' s while the total industry was stagnant . 
This c ompares with a loss in volume in the 1960's, from 49.8 
billion cigarettes in 1960 to 46.5 billion in 1969 (28). 
But Lorillard' s primary role continued to be as Loews' cash 
cow. In 1974 Loews began a phased purchase of CNA Financial 
Corporation, which had been financially troubled. The same 
pattern was repeated in 1979, when Loews purchased the ailing 
Bulova watch company (50) By now Tisch's pattern was clear .
Lorillard was to play a c ash-gener a ting role i n  h is 
acqui siti on strategy, which consisted of pu r cha sing 
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financially strapped compa nies and effecting a turn-around 
through management house-cleaning and infusion of cash. When 
Loews purchased Lorillard, the cigarette company was a major 
portion of the new corporation. Then, as Loews continued its 
diversification, Lorillard became a smaller player in the 
conglomerate company. By 1979, Lorillard only accounted for 
23 percent of Loews' revenues, and 22 percent of its income. 
Unlike American, Reynolds, and Phili p  Morris, Loews had no 
interest in expanding its t obacco business overseas. In a 
strate gic move that differed gre atly from the others, 
Lorillard divested of its international cigarette brands by 
selling them t o  British American Tobacco in 1977 (11). 
1979 - 1987 
In 1 979, Loews Corporation was a holding company for the 
following companies (40): 
CNA Financial Corporation 
Loews' Theatres 
Loews' Hotels 
General Finance Corporation 
Lorillard Division 
Bulova Watch Company 
Loews had been increasing its holdings in the CNA Corporation 
since 1974, and by 1979 owned 84 percent of the company. CNA 
,,,::counted for 65 percent of Loews' revenues in 1980, compared 
-O Lorillard's 23.22 percent. In 1981, Loews' bought back 90
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million dollars of its own stock. It also increased its' 
ownership of CNA to 90 percent. 
The Tis c h  b ro t h e rs c ontin ued to operate L oews as an 
investment vessel, with numerous acquisitions of blocks of 
shares in other companies. Their ownership of Loews reached 
50 percent of total capitalizat ion in 1981, as a result of 
stock buy-backs . Dur ing 1980-81, Loews purchased 5.22 
percent of General Foods common stock , then decreased its 
holding of General Foods to 4.6 percent. It also purchased 
significant blocks of Firestone stock. Other significant 
financial activities by Loews during this period include the 
sales of several major hotels, including the Drake Hotel in 
New York, which was sold for 73.5 million dollars in 1981. 
During the early 1980' s, Loril lard continued to provide 
increasing sales and ear nings despite slippage in its share 
of the domestic cigarette market. Lorillard accomplished the 
increases in earnings through price increases and reductions 
in advertising and operating costs. In 1982, Lorillard was 
able to achieve record revenues and earnings of $1.2 billion 
and $229 mil lion respectively, alt hough its share of the 
cigarette market dropped from 9.3 percent to G.8 percent.
Lorillard was able to recover some of its lost market share 
in 1983, and co�pleted the year with a 9.1 percent market 
3hare. The rebound was largely due to the success of its 
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Newport brand. However, in 1984 Lorillard ran into hard 
times again, losing almost one percent of the market (from 
9.1 to 8.2) Its unit sale s of cigarettes dropped 9.9 
percent, and cigarette revenues decreased by 3.9 percent. 
Thi s  news began to stir rumors of a possible sale of the 
cigarette company by the Tisch brothers (39). Since 1984, 
Lo rillard's share of the cigarette market has stabilized at 
8.1 percent, although unit sales have decreased by about one 
billion units per year, reflecting decreases in the market. 
The rumors of the sale of Lorillard turned out not to be 
true, but in 1985 Loews did make a major strategic move by 
selling of f its original business, Loews Theatres, f or an 
after-tax gain of $80.8 million This sale had the effect of 
concentrating the company's income stream into two major 
sources: Lorillard and CNA Financial. Lorillard represented 
22.4 percent of Loews total revenues in 1985, and CNA 
represented 71 percent of total revenue The earnings 
picture was different: Lorillard prov ided 32 p e rcent of 
operating income, while CNA provided 50 percent. In addition 
to the operating companies, Loews had a stock portfol io of 
over $600 million, under the direction of the Tisch brothers, 
who owned 32 percent of the company's stock (the Tisc h' s had 
reduced their ownership of Loews' stock from a high of 50 
percent in 1981) 
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In 1985 Loews also began a major strategic acquisition which 
made headlines for many months. Under Law r e nce T isch' s 
guidance, Loews purchased approximately 5 five percent of CBS 
common stock (1.3 million shares), and 1 million shares of 
ABC commo n s t ock . Th e to ta l in v e s tmen t in the two 
broadcasting companies reached $250 million. At the time, 
CBS was involved in an unfriendly takeover battle with Turner 
Broadcasting Company, and Lawrence Tisch saw the investment 
potential of owning a sizable share of CBS stock, which he 
felt was undervalued and would rise rapidly as a result of 
the takeover battle. 
By October of 1985, Loews had increased its share of CBS 
stock to 11. l percent, and Tisch announced his intention of 
increasing Loews' ownership of CBS to 25 percent. Loews' 
acquisitions of CBS stock were seen as a more acceptable 
course by CBS than a takeover by Turner Broadcasting. In 
November of 1985 Tisch w as invited to join the board of CBS 
( 1 ) . 
Loew s continued its purchase of CBS stock into 1986, and by 
August of 1986 its ownership of CBS reached 24.9 percent. In 
order to resolve management problems at CBS, Lawrence Tisch 
became its Chief Executive Officer in September of 1986.
Loews announced that it would begin including a portion of
CBS's profits in Loews' earnings starting in the second half
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of 1986, and indications were that the two companies were 
headed for a consolidation at some point in the future . 
LIGGETT 
1954 - 1979 
The story of Liggett and Myers was bluntly summarized by 
James Overton in The Tobacco Industry in Tran sition (28). 
Overton writes: 
Among all corporati on s, Liggett and Myers Tobacco 
Compan y has t o  rate as on e of t he gre at b u sin e s s  
failures of the post-World War II era . From a strong 
position a s  one of the ind ustry's B ig Three (with 
American Tobacco and R .  J. Reynolds) in 1946, Liggett 
and Myers fell to last place among the Big Six producers 
in 1962 and has steadily declined since then, netting a 
dismal 2.7 percent of industry sales in 1979. New brand 
introductions in the 100-millimeter and low-tar markets 
have been busts, and the company has not even developed 
a strong filter entry. 
Liggett's strong suit during the early years of the industry 
was its manufacturing orientation (49). Along with Lorillard 
and American, it also failed to recognize the market changes 
in the 1950's. Lorillard and American were able to retard
the slippage som ewhat on c e  the y re cognized t he market 
changes. Liggett and Myers went into a tailspin, from which 
it did not recover .  Cigarette sales went from 51.2 billion
units in 1960 to 16.5 billion units in 1979. 
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F or Liggett, diversificati on was a matter of survival. It 
became t he fi rs t of the Big Six to be a "di v ersi fi ed 
company", but only because its cigarette business was in such 
a decline that i t  didn't take long f or its non-tobacco 
acquisitions to achieve a prominent role in the company. 
Liggett and Myers began diversification wi th a strategy of 
purch asing product lines which required a h igh degree of 
consumer marketing effor t . It began in 1961, well a fter 
Philip Mo rris and Reynolds, with the acquisition of Allen 
Products, manufacturers of A lpo Dog Food. In 1966 it bou gh t  
the Pa dding t on Cor porati on, and Cari llon I m porters, both 
importers of li q uors . It continued with these two basic 
expansion lines by purchasing two more pet food companies in 
1969, Liv-A-Snaps and Perk Foods, and another liquor company, 
Austin, Nichols. 
Liggett and Myers also made a number of small acquisitions in 
the late 1960' s, such as Nati onal Oa ts Com pany, Brite 
lndustries (watch bands), and Earl Grissmer Company {home-
::are products). 
!n 197'1, Raymond Mulligan became chief executive officer .
�ulligan came fro m  the Allen Pr oducts subsidiary, and 
:0presen ted the first non-tobacco chief execu tive . The 
�pany name was changed from Liggett and Myers Tobacco to 
'e Liggett Group (28). 
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Liggett made two other acquisitions in 1979, before it became 
the target of a takeover. It purchased the Atlantic Soft 
Drink Company, the nation's largest soft drink distributor, 
and Diversified Products, a sporting goods company. 
Liggett's diversification was quite evident at the end of he 
1970's . In 1979, non-tobacco business was 65 percent of 
revenue and 71 percent of operating income . However, its 
dismal performance in the cigarette industry kept its size 
small enough to make it susceptible to a takeover. In fact, 
at several points in the 1970's, Liggett had attempted to 
sell its tobacco operations, to make itself more attractive 
for a potential suitor . Several potential buyers surfaced, 
but were scared off when they discovered the amount of cash 
resources that would be required to make Liggett's tobacco 
business competitive again (21). 
1979 - 1987 
Un l i ke the othe r Big Six, Liggett did not have the huge 
tobacco profits to rely on throughout its diversification 
era . I n stead , Liggett saw its cigarette unit sales and 
market share erode precipitously. By 1979, Liggett' s share 
of the d omestic cigarette market was a paltry 2.8 percent, 
and it had already sold its international cigarette business 
to Philip Morris in 1978. 
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The Liggett Group in 1979 was composed of the followi ng 
companies: 
Company Liggett and Myers Tobacco 
Pinkerton Tobacco Company 
Paddington Corporation 
Austin, Nichols & Co. 
Carillon Importers 
(chewing and pipe tobacco) 
Allen Products Co. 
Atlantic Soft Drink Co. 
Diversified Products Co. 
Earl Grissmer Co. 
Liggett relocated its corporate headquarters from Durham, 
North Carolina to Montvale, Ne w Jersey i n  1979, whe n  it 
changed its name to The Liggett Group. After completion of 
the sale of its international cigarette business to Philip 
Morris, Liggett attempted to sell off its domestic tobacco 
businesses. However, it was unable to close the deal with 
any of its pote ntial buyers . When it became clear that 
selling off the tobacco busine sse s wou l d  be diff ic ult , 
L igge tt adopted a n attitude of milking the busine s s . 
Advertising expenditures were slashed and production was 
consolidated to allow closing of several factories. Largely 
because of these cutbacks, the cigarette bu siness continued 
to make a profit (21). However, these steps also assured the 
continued decline of the cigarette business. 
Liggett' s history as an independent compan y ended in 1980 
when it was acquired by Grand Metropolitan PLC , a l arge 
British Hotel and Liquor company. Grand Metropolitan was
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manufacturer of J & B Scotch, which Liggett distributed in 
the U .  S. through its Paddington subsidiary Gr a n d  
Metropolitan's acquisition o f  Liggett was an unfriendly 
takeover . During the struggle to keep from being acquired, 
Liggett sold off its Austin Nichols liquor subsidiary, to 
mak� itself less attractive to Grand Metropolitan. However, 
Liggett's distribution systems and produc t  lines were still 
consistent with Grand Metropolitan's expansion goals in the 
United States, and the takeover was effected (57). 
In 1980, Gra nd Metropolitan was the thirteenth larg est 
company in Britain, with sales of 5.5 billion dollars per 
yea r . Liggett represented a good exp ansion base for its 
United States operations, especially in the liquor and food 
mar kets . Howeve r, cigarettes did not fit in wit h  Grand 
Metropolitan's strategy. Under Grand Metropolitan, cigarette 
advertising continued to be cut back. In 1980, Liggett spent 
$503,800 to advertise its cigarette brands , compa re d  to 
�;7,079,700 in 1979, and $16,840,000 in 1978. 
Liggett in troduced generic cigarettes in 1980, and it was 
1 nly through the success of this product that Liggett was 
,ible to enlarge its share of the cigarette business. Liggett 
�as able to grow the business by obtaining several large 
0ntracts with distributors . Because of generics, Liggett
��d Myers Tobacco was able to re verse its market share 
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tailspin, showing market share gains in 1981 th rou gh 1985 
( 5 9) 
However , cig arettes still did n ot fit in wi th G rand 
Metropolitan' s long term plans . In 1983, Grand Metropolitan 
reorganized its Liggett Group subsidiary. The non-liquor 
ope rations w ere placed under a holding co m pa ny called 
GrandMet USA, which represents Grand M etropolitan PLC' s 
interests in the Uni' ed States The liquor companies were 
pl aced un der a sep a rat e operating divisio n o f  Grand 
Metropolitan, International Distillers and Vintners . GrandMet 
USA ab sor b ed the corporate staf f of the Liggett Group i n  
Montval e, New J ersey . Once this move was accomplished, 
GrandMet USA put its tobacco businesses up for sale . Liggett 
and Myers' management attempted to buy the business back from 
Grand Metropolitan in 1984, but the deal was not consummated. 
Li ggett m anag ement w as not able to obtain the required 
financing, du e to the u n certain futu re o f  the Lig gett 
cigarette lines . 
In July 1985, GrandMet was able to sell the Pinkerton Tobacco 
�ubsidiary to a Swedish company, Svenska Tob aks AB . And 
:inally, in November 1986 the Liggett Group was s old to 
�nvestor Bennett S. LeBow . At the time of its sale, Liggett
j · f' ~ent of the domestic cigarette-i r appr oximately iv e per c, 
--�rket, composed primarily of generics
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BROWN AND WILLIAMSON 
1954 - 1979 
Brown and Williamson is a who lly owned subsidiary of British-
Ameri c an Tobacco (BAT). BAT is the major cigarette producer 
in the world, with over twenty percent of the world cigarette 
market. 
Brown and Williamson was a steady perfo rmer throughout th e 
1950' s, 60's and 70's. It to o fa iled to respond quickly 
e nough to the trends for filtered and low tar cigarettes, but 
it managed to capitalize on several successful brands such as 
Kool, to rise t o  number three (from number five) in industry 
market share. However, the rise to number three was not so 
much Brown and Williamson's do ing. It resulted main ly from 
the poor performances by Ligget t, American, and Lorillard. 
Brown an d Wi lliams on's unit sales actua lly fe ll from 103 
billion in 1974 to 88 billion in 1979, while it wa s improving 
its market share. 
B e i ng a su b sidiary o f  a d i v ersifi e d  c ompan y m a de 
diversification a litt le more difficult for Brown and 
Williamson. Its strategy had to fit with BAT's strategy, and 
BAT resisted expansion through the Brown and Willia mson unit, 
due to fear o f  th e Securities and Exch ange c o mmission 
scrutiny of foreign investors. Finally, in 1969, Brown and
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W illi a m s on beg an divers ifying by purch a s ing Vita Food 
Products, Aleutian King Crabs, and Sea Pass Corporation. This 
exp a n s i on into the food bus ines s was foll owed by the 
acquisitions in 1972 and 73 of Gimbel Brothers Department 
Stores, Sak' s Fifth Avenue, and the Kohl Corporation (grocery 
chain). The moves into retailing were more consistent with 
BAT' s corporate strategy (28). 
Like the other cigarette companies, Brown and Williamson 
Tobacco changed its name, to Brown and Williamson Industries, 
in 1974. Later, BAT reorganized its American subs i d i a ry 
operati ons as BATUS (for BAT, U.S.), and made Brown and 
Williamson a division within BATUS (58). 
1979 -1987 
Since its reo rganizati on in 1979 as BATUS, Brown and 
Will i am s on' s d iversification pattern h as fol lowed the 
patterns of its parent company, BAT. BAT' s strateg y, as 
desc ribed b y  its chai rman Patrick Sheehy, has been to 
diversify such that it is composed of fou r equ al parts
tob acco, retailing, paper, and financial services (20, 51).
Although BATUS has lagged behind its parent in the financial
ser v i c es area , it a c h i e v e d  a s i gnific a nt l evel o f
divers ification through its acquisition and expansion of
A ated an d s eve ral g rocery and PPleton P ape rs Incorpor , 
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department store chains . In 1979, BATUS was composed of the 
following divisions: 
Kohl's Food and Department Stores 
Gimbel's Department Stores 
Marshal Field Company 
Appleton Papers 
In the early 1980' s, BATUS conti nued expansion of i t s  
retai li n g  sec t or . By 1982, it ha d added Frederick and 
Nelson, J. B. Ivey, John Breuner Company, The Crescent, and 
Thimbles to the list above . The retail businesses in 1982 
represented 2.97 billion dollars in sales compared to 2.13 
billion for tobacco, but tobacco' s operuting income was 364.4
million dollars compared to retai ling' s 161.8 million . BATUS'
retailing sector was the 19th largest retailing business in 
the United States . 
Th e papermaking side of BATUS has b een a relatively minor 
portion of the company compared to retailing and tobacco . In 
1983, Appleton's operating income was 80 million dollars, on 
sales of 465 million dollars . However, the paper business 
st ill played a role in BATUS' strategy. In 1984, BATUS 
sought to strengthen its presence i n  this segment with the
purchases of two paper m ills, one from the P .  H. Glatfelter 
Company and the other form the Nashua Company. 
BATUS' aggressive moves into the retail
ing business have not
been totally successful. The Gimbels chain had difficulties
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turning consistent profits since its purchase, and the other 
retailing units began to show signs of faltering in t he 
1980's. In 1986, BATUS undertook a major restructuring of 
its retailing operations, selling off or closing it s Gimbels 
stores, and selling the Kohl's, Frederick and Nelson, and The 
Crescent chains. The businesses sold represented 1.4 billion 
dollars in sales. BATUS kept Sak's, Marshal Fields, Ivey's, 
Breuners, and Thimbles in its retai li ng sec to r, for a 
combined presence in r etailing of 2.4 billion dollars per 
year in retail sales. 
BATUS remained a strong force in the cigarette market, with 
the introduction of one of the most successful new brands in 
the BO' s, Barclay. This cigarette had a controversial new 
filter which allowed Brown and Williamson to claim that the 
cigarette a 99 percent tar reduction. Based largely on the 
success of this brand, and its move into the generic market, 
Brown and Williamson has been able to hold on �o third place 
in th e domestic cigarette market. Brown and Williamson al so 
has a healthy export business, with suc cesses in Japan and 
other countries in the Far East. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGIES AND RESULTS, 1979-1986 
Background 
As we saw in the pre vious chapter, the evolution of the Big 
Six has resulted in major changes in their str uctures, both 
w it h in an d out side the tobacc o  i n d ustry . Wit h i n  th e 
industry, we have seen a concentration on cigarettes. None 
of the Big Six are currently involved in any tobacco products 
other than cigarettes whereas in 1979 Ameri can ha d a 
sig nific a nt p r esence in ciga r s, and R. J. Reyno lds and 
L orillard had other tobacco products such as chewing and pipe 
tobacc os. We also saw the emergence of generic cigarettes, 
which helped Liggett survive in the business, but created a 
price c ompeti ti on within the cigarette market which has 
affected the way cigarettes are marketed. 
Our focus in this paper is to look at non-tobacco activities 
of the Big-Six, and in this a rea the chang es ha ve been 
astr onomi ca l. Since 1979, diversi fication activities have
resulted in major changes in the structures and the financial 
performance of the Big Six. Liggett, as we saw earlier, has
made a full circle- from tobacco company, to diversified
conglomerate, to diversified subsidiary, and no
w back to a
cigarette company looking for diversifi
cation opportunities.
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R. J. Reynolds and Philip Morris have become major forces in 
the food industry, and have withdrawn from o ther business 
linf"Co. And Lorillard, after carrying the Loews corporation 
through som e difficult t imes in the e arly 80' s has now 
resumed its role as the cash c ow for Loews' cont inued 
diversification activities. 
Methodology 
I analyzed the relative success of the Big Six in non-tobacco 
businesses in financial terms. The focus was to look at the 
profit contributions of the non-tobacco businesses of the Big 
Six, and the re turns on investments provided by the non-
tobacco businesses The primary sour ces of d a t a were 
c o r por at e annu al r e ports, financial per i odicals, and 
investment company reports. 
In co nducting the analysis, I det ermined that dat a for 
Ligge t t  and Brown and Will iamson w ould no t b e  directly 
comparable t o  the other four. Both of these companies were 
subsidiaries of foreign corporations during the period of 
intere s t ,  and specific financial inf o rmation on their
�perations was not available . In addition, their non-tobacco
�orations were driven by the overall corporate strategies of
heir parent c o mpa nies, so tha t Ligget t and Brown and
,, i 1 1 i a m s o n n o t i n  d1- re ct c o n t r o l
0 f 
This is quite evident in the 
were their 
:,',f2'r;c;ification strc1teqies 
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case o f  the Ligg ett Gr oup, which was acquired by Grand 
Metropolitan, stripped of all its non-tobacco operations, and 
then s p u n  off as a cigarette c ompany again. For these 
reasons, Liggett and Brown and Williamson were not inc luded 
in the analy sis. 
Although Lorillard was also not a surviving corporate entity, 
it was retained in the analysis because Lorillard was a major 
factor in the di ve rsifi cation strategies of the L o e w s  
Corporation. It supplied a large portion of Loews' cash flow 
during the early 1980's. Lorillard {Loews Corporation) also 
pr ovides us w it h  a go o d  con trast i n  di v e rs if icati o n  
strategies with the other three companies retained i n  the 
study. 
Measures of Success 
Two criteria were set for comparisons of the four companies: 
degree of diversification, and financial performance of n on-
tobacco businesses. Within these overall criteria, several 
analyses were 
3 U C C e S S 
conducted to arrive at quantitative measures of
Fo r t h e  t ob a c c o c om p a n i e s , d e g r e e  0 f 
diversification is a significant meas u re because of the
�Jlatilit y of the ind ustry in current times.
 The industry
joys very favorabl� profit margins and cash fl ows, 
yet
:ids to have undervalued stock because
 of perceived problems
n regard to product liab
ility lawsuits and the overall 
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de c line in the dom est ic c ig are tte market . Through 
diversification, the industry can ease some of these fears on 
the part of current and potential stockholders. The relative 
financial performance o f  the non-tobacco businesses is the 
other cr itical factor in comparing the companies' strategies, 
because the companies must invest the tobacco profits wisely 
in order to insure the high retu rns that tobacco company 
stockh olders expect. 
Analysis of Acquisitions/Divestitures 
In the May-June 1987 issue of the Harvard Busi ness Rev i ew, 
Michael Porter analyzed the diversification trends of major 
U.S. corporations (55) . However, instead of detailed 
financial analysis, he us ed one semi-quantitative measure: 
~ne number of acquisitions versus the number of divestitures 
�or each company . His logi c is based on the simple 
assumption that companies don't div est successful operations, 
��cept in very rare changes of strategy. Using this simple 
��chnique, Dr. Port er was able to make some observations on 
he corporate strategies of American corporations, which were
)t very complimentary: 
The track record of corp orate strategies has been
dismal. I studied the diversification records of �3
large, prestigious U.S. com panies over the 1950-1986
period and found that most of them had divested many
more acquisitions than they had kept. The corporate
strategies of most companies have dissi
pated instead of
2reated stockholder wealth (55) ·
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T he Big Six w ere not included in Dr. Porter' s study, although 
Genera l Foods, which was ac quired by Philip Morris, was one 
of his ori�inal group of companies. 
Dr. Porter found that the divestment rate for acquisitions in 
non-related fields was 74 percent, a key result in backing up 
his c o ncl usio ns on the poor per forma nce of cor p orate 
strategies. 
In order to assess the tobacco companies' acquisition record, 
� summarized their acquisition/divestiture histori es from 
1979-1987 The results are shown in Tables IV-VII. T hese 
results can not be compared directly to Porter' s observations 
for the companies he studied, because it covers a much 
shorter time frame than Porter ' s  analysis However, by 
analyzing the informati o n  available for the cigarette 
c ompa n i e s  we c a n s e e n o t o n l y t h e i r r e c e n t 
acquisi tion/ d i vest i ture tr ack reco rds 
different strategies applied by the companies. 
but also the 
For example, 
Table IV provides a clear indication of Loews' approach, 
�� ch is a portfolio management strategy. 
Jews ' acquisitions ca�e through purchases o: blocks of 
[uities of the target companies Loews had a relativel y
,lJ. nurr;ber or ::;hareholciers (nppro:.-:ima
tely 7, 000 ), and more
1 n fortv percent of the ownership 
was s hared by t he Tisch
:he Loews Corporation 
has been handled essentially
;; 1 
i 
as an- investment p ortfolio, with Lorillard supplying t he 
infu sion of cash n e ed ed for acquisitions. In addition to 
the operating companies, th e c orporation had a sizeable 
equity portfo lio (1.2 billion d ollars i n  1986). At one point 
Loews owned 5.4 perc ent of the American Bro adcasting Company 
and 5.22 percent o f  Gen eral Fo ods. CNA, w hich is n ow the 
major subsidiary in the Loews family, was acquired piecemeal 
over a ten year period. The CNA subsidi ary gave the Tisch 
br others an o th er conduit thr ough which t o make investment 
moves. Many of t he investments made in the 1980's were made 
jointly by t he par en t corpora tion and the in sur an ce 
subsidiary, although the investment incomes for th e parent 
and subsidiary were reported separately. 
In 1985, Loews began to purc hase shar es of CBS stock, and 
built up its ownership of CBS to 25 percent in 1987. Lawrence 
Tisch became chairman of CBS, and it appear ed that the two 
companies w ere headed for a merger. Loews' strat egy for 
acquir ing CNA an d CBS is in sharp contrast with the 
strategies of Reyno lds and Philip Morris. Loews preferr e d  t o  
acquire equity in the acquired companies over 2 l ong period 
of time, where as Philip Morr is and Reyn o lds made major 
acquisitions al l at once. 
Table IV s hows that Loews became more di versified in the
· r� added the Bulova company to its business?eriod 1979-1987. -
' . 
tines, consolidated its inve5tment
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in the insura:-,ce business 
through increased ownership of CNA, and began its purchase of 
CBS. In addition, Loew s entered the shippin g business by 
purchasing several tankers and forming the Majestic Shipping 
Company. However, Loews also made some key divestment moves 
when it sold the General Finance subsidiary, and its original 
business, Loews Theatres. 
In contrast wit h L oews, Reynolds has moved to consolidate, 
rather than diversify its business line:i. As Table V shows, 
Rey no lds sold its energy, transportation, and distilled 
spirits businesses, and m ade significant purchases in the 
food bu:;ine:,s The dollar amounts of Reynolds' acquisitions 
and divestitures are key indicators of Reynolds' major shift 
in strategy. Reynolds divested of 4.4 billion dollars of 
previous acquisitions in the period 1979-1986, and sp ent 7.2 
oi llion dol lars in new acquisitions This is by far the 
largest ratio of divestments to acquisitions for th e four 
�ampanies analyzed. 
:�ble VI shows the dynamic acquisition strategy of American 
':,-1nds. American had established its strategy for business 
·n b 1979 and 1'n the period 1979-1937 it concentrated on- es y , 
'' ct' h 1·nes t hrough acq uisitions of smal l  �i� 1ng up t ese 1 
�panies to supplement its existing �usinesses. Although 
- · ,�ons�derahly during the p eriod an d hasc'l:1can has g rown - � -
:reased the size of its non t
obacco portfolio, it h as
· .:al l.y become a less diversifie
d corporation 1n terms of
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the number of unrelated businesses. At the same time that it 
has b een adding to its office p roducts, financial services, 
and distilled spirits businesses, American has been divesting 
its food businesses, such as Duffy Mott, Taylor Foo ds, and 
Sunshine Biscuits. (The plan to div est Sunshine Biscuits was 
annou nced i n  December 1 987 .) The Sunsh ine Biscuit s 
divestitu re i s  significan t b ecause this was the first 
acquisition in American's diversification program, in 1966. 
Philip Morris, shown on Table VII, was the only one to make a 
si gnificant acquisit ion in t he tobacco business It had 
purchased Lig getts' international brands in 1978, and in 1981 
it purchased a 20 percent share of the holdings of Rothmans 
International. As the table shows, Philip Mo rris a lso 
decreased its number of business lines in 1979-87. It sold 
off the companies in its Industrial group, and also sol d the 
Seven-Up company. These actions, in conjunction with the 
purchase of General Foods, hav e made Phi l ip Mo rri s less 
dependent on tobacco, yet more concentrated in th e area of 
consumer products. 
The acquisition/divestiture tables show the wide differences
in the companies' strategies, but they also reflect t he
uriderlying difference;:; in th," success of the companies within
l • d �try Philip Morris' success inand outside the tooacco in u . 
the cigarette industry is highligh
ted by the fact that in one
1 -
· 1· i 1· t _c_,· 1··_,,, .•1 t m c·J � ··- t· h a n t. w i' � e t l1 e 
:c; .:. n g l e p u r c h a s e ( C e n e r Zl , c) n c c • 
- ·  � - '·
(4 
amount that American spent for acquisitions from 1979 to 
1986. American's succ ess outside the tobacco industry is 
shown by its ratio of divestitures to acquisitions, which is 
the lowest of th e  four companies An d, Reynolds complete 
rear rangement of its business lines is indicati ve of its 
struggle to develop a corporate identity and preserve its 
profit margins. During the time period covered by this study, 
Reynolds lost its number one market share position in the 
cigarette industry to �hilip Morris. Its major cigarette 
brands lost both volume and market share. At the same time, 
ts energy and shi pping subsidiaries we re faced with 
lifficult times due t o  the volatility of oil prices. 
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TABLE IV 
LOEWS CORPORATION ACQUISITIONS AND DIVESTITURES 
1979 
1981 
: 9 81 
ACQUISITION 
Bulova Watch Co. 
Increased ownership 
of CNA from 58 to 
79 %. 
5.4 % of American 
Broadcasting Co. 
�981 5.22 % of General 
Foods 
, S 1 
4.8 % of Storer 
Communications 
.. :. 4 8 . 5 15 of St ,. Regis 
Corporation 
Purchased shares of 
CRS Inc., to 25 � 
owner:;hip. 
Formed Majestic 
Shipping Co. 
Total: 
1979-1987 
AMOUNT 
35 
166 
44. 
81 
24 
100 
1,061 
47 
1,558 
DIVESTITURE 
Drake Hotel, N. Y.
350,000 Shares of 
Gen(;;;ral Foods 
(Reduced ownership 
to 4.8 %) 
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Co. 
(lowered ownership from 
AMOUNT 
74 
11 
17 % to 2.5 % 13 
General Finance Corp. 193 
�aews Theatres Group 158 
449 
' .. ,,. '1 
* 
1~ounts in millions of dclla~s. 
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TABLE V 
R. J. REYNOLDS ACQUISITIONS AND DIVESTITURES 
1979-1987 
·•---,�te Co.
AMOUNT
1 
618 
�1ozen Foods N/A 
1 ·h AG N/A 
· :-·� Management N/A
: Services
; :, Inc. 
-:-,,ek Corg.
,-,c Inc. 
Soft Drinks 
:· s:_,::, ?ota l: 
1,295 
74 
40 
57 
175 
4,900 
7,159 
�illions of dollars. 
DIVESTITURE 
cut & Ready Potatoes 
Endico Potatoes 
Granny Goose Snacks 
California Pretzel 
Alaska Packers Assoc. 
Sea-Land Corp. 
4 
Aminoil Inc. 
Service Systems Corp. 
Skolniks Bagel 
Bakeries 
Dental Care of America 
Kentucky Fried Chicken 
Canada Dry and Sunkist 
Chuckles Candies 
Bear Creek Corp. 
Filmco Internatioanl 
Heublein Inc. 
AMOUNT 
N/A
2 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
400 
1,700 
N/A 
N/A 
840 
230 
N/A 
N/A 
'35 
1,200 
4, 4 0 5 
: disclosed. Items shown as N/A are cons idered minor 
livestitures, and do not significantly affect the 
;tarted as a joint venture between R. J. Reynolds and 
��f to R. J. Reynolds stoc�holders. R. J. Reynolds 
r:ci2-lion dollars by the new Sea-Land Company. 
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TABLE VI 
AMERICAN BRANDS ACQUISITIONS AND DIVESTITURES 
1979-1987 
b!=:QUISITION 
1 
AMOUNT 
1979 Completed the 
acquisition of 
Franklin Life 
Insurance Co. 644 
1981 
L982 
l ')BJ
Offrex Group Limited 
(Great Britain) 
Miscellaneous 
purchases by 
70 
Gallaher subsidiary 34 
Pinkerton's Security 
Eastlight Limited 
(Great Britain} 
159 
36 
:SS4 Southland Life 
85 
Insurance 355 
Prestige Group L7D. 72 
(Great Britain) 
Foot-Joy Inc. 
Dexter Lock Co. 
Bonny Products Inc. 
BASTX Controls 
c4 
:i 2
N/A 
N/A 
78 
NSS Newsagents PLC 126 
(Great Rritain) 
ACCO World Inc. 
National Distillers 
and Chemical 
Approximate Total: 
600 
545 
2,723 
,:�.,)1:TJ��i; in millions of dollars -
DIVESTITQfhl::_ 
Duffy-Mott 
American Cigar 
Taylor roods 
AMOUNT 
60 
14 
18 
92 
ts w��c not disclosed. Items shown as N/A
 are considered minor
·' - · · · · · · f · cantly aff,0ct the totals.-0icions, anc de not signi i ·· 
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TABLE VII 
PHILIP MORRIS ACQUISITIONS AND DIVESTITURES
·: .�_ITIIJN
: ?.othmans 
: 1r_ional 
'.i..n�� Co. 
:•ritain) 
, .. f_)Odci 
i,, Snacks 
c reihofer 
: . :'i 
-:::,·HO Total: 
1979-1987 
350 
5, 600 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
100 
6,050 
DIVESTITURE AMOUNT 
') 
Nicolet Paper N/A' 
Wisconsin Tissue Mill::,, 
and Plainwell Paper 210 
Seven Up International 
Seven Up Domestic 
246 
240 
696 
�illions of dollars. 
:,Jt disclosed. Items shown as N/A are considered minor
•::.vestitures, and do not significantly affect the
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::: :) 
· · ic 
. :,l 
Degree of Diversification 
Economists have developed an index for market concentration, 
called the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, (or H-Index) ( 2 , 8) • 
T he normal use for this index is to measure the degree of 
c oncentration in a given industry, for example, to determine 
if an anti-competitive situation exi sts in that industry. 
Berry utilized a modified version of this index to determine 
t he d egree of diversification of a given firm in sev eral 
business lines (13). The index, as modified by Berry, is: 
2 
H l - L p.
l 
where p represents the fraction of revenue (or incom e) that 
the firm recei ves from a particular business line .  For 
example, in 1986 Philip Morris received 12 perce nt of its 
revenue from beer, 38 percent from food, and 50 percent from 
tobacco. Therefore its diversification index is H= 1- .122 
+ .382 + .502) • 5 9 . An H-Index of 0.0 represents a totally 
undiversified firm. The higher the H-Index, the more highly
diversified the firm is. 
The diversification indices for the four companies in thi s
t d te-d fcir both revenue and operating income.s u y were compu , 
The results are shown in Table VIII. 
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TABLE VIII 
DIVERSIFICATION INDICES FOR THE 
INDEPENDENT CIGARETTE COMPANIES
REVENUS S 
YEAR 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
.QJ'J.: RATING 
YEAR 
1979 
1980 
1 9 8 l 
l 9 8 2 
1983 
1 9 8 4 
1985 
1986 
c,E':gc n d: 
INCOME 
?� = Philip Morri5 
PM 
0.51 
0. '.:i 0
0 . 5 0 
0. 4 8
0 . 4 5 
0 . 4 4 
0 . 5 1 
0.59 
PM 
0.32 
0 . 2 5 
0 . 2 0 
0.18 
0.23 
0 . 1 4 
0 . 1 9 
0. 4 0
RJR 
ew3 Corporation AMil 
RJR LTR 
0 . 5 6 0 . 7 4 
0. 6 3 0.74 
0 . 6 5 0 . 7 3 
0 . 6 6 0 . 7 1 
0.58 0.72 
0.51 0 . 7 0 
0.50 0 . 6 6 
0.46 0 . 6 1 
RJR LTR 
0 . 3 5 0.83 
0.37 0 . 7 7 
0. 4 3 0. 7 6
0.44 0 . 5 2 
0.43 0.56 
0 . 3 0 0.50 
0.40 0.69 
0 . 4 6 d . 6 6 
fi .  ,J. Reynolds 
A m e r i c a n B r- a :1 ci s 
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AMB 
0.60 
0 . 5 8 
0. 5 7
0 . 5 6 
0.59 
0 . 6 1 
0 . 6 1 
0 . 6 0 
AMB 
0 . 5 3 
0 . 5 2 
0. 6 5
0. 61
0.63 
0.64 
0 . 6 2 
0 . 6 0 
'~'R Lo 
Table VIII shows clearly the concentration of Philip Morris' 
operating income throughout the early 1980' s .  Alth ough 
Philip Morris had made acquisitions in the beer and soft-
drink industries, and although Miller had made significant 
progress in sales vo lu me a nd market position ,  the 
overwhelmi ng portion of operating income still came from 
cjgarettes .  Figure IV shows that from 1978 to 1982 the non-
tobacco contribution to operating income actually decreas ed. 
It wasn't until 1986, with the acquisition of General Foods, 
that non-tobacco income increased significantly. H,.1wever, 
even in 1986, the first full year of General Foods figures, 
operating income from non-tobacco operations was 20 percent 
of the total, compared with 50 percent of the revenues . 
R .  J .  Reynolds d iversification index shows it to be more 
diversified throughout the early eighties th�n Philip Morris . 
It was during this period that Reyno lds was involved in the 
energy and transportation businesses, in addition to the food 
and tobacco businesses . RJR' s revenue concentration i ndex 
shows it becoming less diversified, as it began to spin off 
businesses to concentrate on tobacco and foods . However, as 
Fig u r e  III sho.:s R,JR' s tobacc non-tobacco income 
contribution l S similar: to Phi.:_ip t·1 o r r i s No n tobacco
b · · 191'<,6 acrounted for over 60 perc ent of theusinesses ir, -
revenue, but only JO percent f the operating income 
,, ,.. I'-
0 VS. 
0 
Loews' diversifica tion index shows it to be the most 
diversified corporation of the four, in both revenue and 
income However the indices for 1982-1985, and the tobacco 
vs. non tobacco income for Lhese years (Figure VI) show a 
very d ramatic picture of the importance of Loews' Lorillard 
tobacco unit . During these years, Loews' insur a nce and 
financial services wer1t throu gh some difficult periods 
created by the competitive situation in the life insurance 
business. Had it not been for the income generated by the 
Lorillard unit, Loews would have reported s ome very dismal 
inc ome figures for those years. Figure VI shows that in 
1982-84 non-tobacco income dr opped to appr oximat el y 35 
percent of corporate income, compared to 77 percent in 1979. 
American's indices show it to be the most s table in terms of 
both revenue and income As stated earlier, American had 
settled on a business-line strat egy prior t o  1979, and 
concentrated on building up those lines through acquisitions. 
Figure v shows a very close match Letween tobacco and n on-
t ob acc o  reven ues and inc ome However, this result is
somewhat misleadi ng because, as we s hal l see l a t e r,
American's profit margin on tobacco was much lower than the 
others. The �ajority of American's tobacco revenue came from 
its in t ernational unit, and the profit ma rgins on th e 
inter national sales were considerably 
lower than on domestic
sales . 
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FIGURE 3 
R. J. REYNOLDS NON-TOBACCO REVENUE AND INCOME 
1979 - 1986 
Source: Annual Reports Uii. 62I . 
-------
-
- .... ,,_ ---------- �� �� --- �� -- --� ,,_ 
-----
O+-------,-,-----,-------r,----,-,-----,--------.-----i 
1979 19B0 1981 1982 1983 1984 19B5 1986 
YEAR 
REVENUE OPERATING INCOHE ----
X 
0 
z 
H 
LL 
0 
- 74 -
FIGURE 4 
PHILIP MORRIS NON-TOBACCO REVENUE AND INCOME 
1979 - 1985 
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FIGURE 5 
AMERICAN BRANDS NON-TOBACCO REVENUE AND INCOME 
1979 - 1986 
Source: Annual Reports (51 . 
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FIGURE 6 
LOEWS CORPORATION NON-TOBACCO REVENUE ANO INCOME 
1979 - 1986 
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Source: Annual Reports (401. 
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Profitability of Non-Tobac co Operations 
The most important measure o f  success is the profit margin 
contribution that the non-tobacco businesses have made to the 
corporation . Tobacco versus non-tobacco margins (operating 
income bef ore taxes and interest, divided by revenue) are 
shown in T ab le IX. This table shows that only American has 
been able to achieve profit margins i n  the non-tobacco se ctor 
that approach those of the tobacco sector . And, this result 
is skewed by t he low pr ofit margins of American ' s  
internatio nal tobacco operations . American' s domestic 
tobacco margins are in the 26-29 percent range, compared to 
the international tobacco margins of 4 percent . 
However, the key piece of information provided in table IX is 
the profit margins of the non-tobacco businesses, and in this 
area American is the clear leader . Its non-tobacco pro fit 
margins have ranged from 11 to 15 percent over th e  last five 
years . Philip Morris had only one year above five percent, 
and Loews had several of five percent or le ss, during its 
proble�s in the insurance business. 
Results such as those shown in Tab le IX led Seneker to
d " · " i' n the diversification gameec lare American th e winner 
( 6 7} . In a Forbes article published
 in August 1985, Seneker
compared American' s diversificatio
n results to those of the
Other cigarette companies, a
nd concluded that American has
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.. , best use of its tobacco money to diversify into non-
:n Assets 
�ay to measure the performance of the n on-tobacco 
�s is to anal yze t hei r r eturns on non-tobacco and 
assets . In order to make direct comparisons , I 
return on assets (ROA) by dividing operating profits 
1cco and n on-tobacco segments by their resp e ctive 
1UC5 . Therefore these ROA' s are on a pre interest, 
:J as is Table X shows the results. 
·omparisons can be made from Table X .  First, we can
relative differences between tobacco and non-tobacco
•�·i1ch company. We can also compare the performance of 
'.·,1cc o a nd no n  tobac co segments among the f o u r  
_ y at the t obacco segments for each company, we see 
�ican's ROA' s have held relatively steady . American 
)lidated its tobacco operations and has not made any 
�ital expansions, because of its decreasing marke t  
shown dramatic increases in its tobacco RO�. During
, Lori'llard division consolidated its1 9 .'J O 1 5 T, 0 e W S - -
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Jr-eas .. 
production facilities into one major manufacturing facility 
in North Carolina. Lorillard' s results are also helped by 
the fact that it has no international tobacco operations. 
Philip Morris and RJR are the only companies which have made 
major investments in the tobacco area in the la st t en years. 
Phi lip Morris has made major capital investments i n  the 
United States and overseas, and these results are evident in 
it s increa sing ROA over the last eight years Rey nolds 
undertook a multi-year one billion dollar capital inve stment 
in its domesti c cigarette operations in 1981. The results of 
that program have b een to reduce ROA. However, once the 
program is completed in 1988, Reynolds will reap the benefits 
reduced manufacturing costs. 
:n the non-tobacco areas, the results again point to American 
3rands as the leader. From 1979 to 1986 Americar achieved
ROA's which were twice as high as those of the other three. 
of 
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TABLE IX 
TOBACCO AND NON-TOBACCO OPERATING MARGINS 
FOR THE INDEPENDENT TOBACCO COMPANIES 
YEAR: 7Q 80 81 82, 83 84 
PHILIP MORRIS: 
DOMESTIC T0B. 0.25 0.24 0.24 0. 25 0.24 0.28 
INT' L T0B. 0.10 0.10 0 .11 0 .13 0.10 0 .11 
TOTAL T0B. 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.19 0.22 
NON-T0B. 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.05 
13, ,T. REYNOLDS: 
DOMESTIC T0B. 0.23 0.23 0.23 * * * 
INT'L T0B. 0.08 0.08 0.08 
TOTAL T0B. 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.17 
N0N-T0I3. 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 
_:LOEWS CORPORATION: 
TOBACCO. 
NON-TOBACCO 
AMERIC[IN _BRANDS: 
DOMESTIC T0B. 
INT'L TOB. 
TOTAL T03.
NON-TOLl,\CCO 
0.12 
0 .12 
0.24 
0.04 
0.11 
0. 0 8
0.15 0.16 0.20 0.17 0.20 
0.08 0.08 0.03 0.05 C.04
0.25 0.26 0.28 0.26 0.27 
0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0. C 4
0.10 0.10 0 .11 0.11 0.12 
0.08 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.14 
85 
0.31 
0 .11 
0.23 
0.05 
* 
0.18 
0.08 
0.22 
0.07 
0.29 
0.04 
0.12 
0 .13 
� Reynolds did not break domestic vs. international figures for
Yea ts. 
�ote: Loews does not have an international tobacco business. 
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0.34 
0.09 
0.23 
0.05 
0.31 
0.18 
0.28 
0.09 
0.28 
0.05 
0.25 
0.04 
0.10 
0 .11 
these 
TABLE X 
TOBACCO AND NON-TOBACCO RETURN ON ASSETS 
FOR THE INDEPENDENT TOBACCO COMPANIES 
YEAR: 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 
PHILIP MORRIS: 
TOBACCO 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.31 0.33 0.42 0.44 0.49 
NON-TOBACCO 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.09 
TOTAL 0.20 0 .1.9 0.17 0.20 0.24 0.29 0.17 0.24 
R. J. REYNOLDS: 
TOBACCO 0.42 0.44 0.40 0.37 0.35 0.36 0.33 0.34 
NON-TOBACCO 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.07 
TOTAL 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.13 0.15 
LOEWS CORPORATION: 
-TOBACCO 0.19 0.28 0.31 0.41 0.45 0.48 0.60 0.77 
NON-TOBACCO 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 
TOTAL 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.07 
AMERICAN BRANDS: 
TOBACCO 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.30 0.34 0.32 0.29 
NON-TOBACCO 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.07 
TOTAL 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.19 0.17 
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Capital Investments 
In addition to acquisitions outside tobacco, the four tobacco 
companies have been making significant capital invest men ts in 
th es e  busin e sses to inc r ease their markets and improv e 
manufac turing efficiencies . Again, it is int er esting to not e 
the degree of investments in support of the tobacco and non-
tobac c o  se gmen t s for each c ompany This analysis was 
conduct ed by computing the ratio of capital expenditures to 
existing assets for each company. The r esul ts are shown on 
Table XI . 
Loews' non-tob acco resul ts cannot be compared dire ct ly to the 
other three because of Loews heavy involvement in industries 
such as finan cial s e rvices, whi ch do not require large 
capi tal expenditures .  However, comparing the others we can 
see that both Philip Morris and Reynolds made hea vy c apital 
expans ions in the non-tobacco busin esses during the early
1980' s .  During this time, Phil ip Morris was still increasing 
Miller' s br ewing capacity, and Reynolds was investing heavi ly 
in its en ergy, transportation, and food busine ss es .  The 
n umbers are indicative of the cha ng e s  tha t these t wo
companies have under gon e in the last five years . In
Reynolds' case, the results for the last five years reflect
its divestitures of the e�ergy and transportation businesses,
nd Ls dGcisi n to inv�st in the �cquis
i tions of food and
�av�raqe businesses �uch as Nabisco
 and Heublein, instead of
83 -
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investing more in the existing subsidiaries. �hilip Morris 
completed its major expansions in the brewing area, and also 
turned it s at tention to non-tob acco acquisitions. The 
results for 1985 show Philip Mor ri s investing only 1.5 
percent of its non tobacc o assets T hi:, n umbe r is 
a rtificially low due to the impact of the General Foods 
acquisition late in the year, which practically doubled the 
year-end asset base. 
American Brands' p attern of capital exp enditures did not 
cha nge significantly. American continued its strategy of 
supporting its business lines, while making acquisitions in 
areas related to the busines s lines it had established before 
1979. 
The tobacco investment numbers are also of interest, because 
they reflect the diversificJtion strategies of the companies. 
In this regard we can see that bot h  Philip Morris an d 
Reynol ds have ma de significant ad dit ions to their tobacco 
asset bases, whereas th e other two have not . Table XI 
refle cts the major construction programs con ducted by Philip 
Morris in the early 1980's, which included the completion of 
· , th c ·li'na and a maJ·or investment in•:.i n e n e w f a c t o r y i n h o r a r ,i , 
•� · t' L 
· vi'lle oper•ti'on, �s well as significanti s exis ing ouis O • 
intern�tional i.nvestments Reynolds' results reflect the
:::a,ajo1� 1-nvestinc11t ?.cynold 5 began i:1 1981 t.�, huild t si 
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Tobaccoville fa cility in North Carolina, in addition to major 
improvements to its existing facilities. 
The tobacco investment results also reflect the status of the 
companies tobacco businesses. PhiJip Morris hns continued to 
invest in tobacco because it s performnnce in the business 
warranted a growth oriented capit al investment pro gram. 
Reynolds major investments in tobacco reflect an attempt to 
improve manufncturing efficienc ies, and support its fight 
with Philip Morr is to regain market shares. American and 
Loews have continued their strategy of supporting but not 
expanding their tobacco businesses. 
s -
TABLE XI 
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES 
FOR THE FOUR INDEPENDENT TOBACCO COMPANIES 
(Expressed as percent of existing capital assets 
in tobacco or non-tobacco business lines) 
YEAR: 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 
PHILIP MORRIS: 
TOBACCO 5.9 9.6 11. 5 9.8 6.3 3.2 2.7 3.3 
NON-TOBACCO 14.2 9.8 8.7 7.9 5.6 3.2 1.5 4.6 
TOTAL 9.6 9.7 10.3 9.0 6.0 3.2 1. 9 4 .1 
R. J. REYNOLDS: 
TOBACCO 3.8 5.4 6.1 7.3 11. 4 14.1 14.4 12.6 
NON-TOBACCO i3.9 14.8 11. 3 8.3 8.4 5.3 4.4 3.6 
TOTAL 10.7 12.0 9.5 8.0 9.4 8.9 7.1 6.2 
LOEWS CORPORATION: 
TOBACCO 2.6 2.6 3. 9 2.1 2.4 3.5 3.2 2.8 
NON-TOBACCO 0. 4 0. 4 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 
TOTAL 0.6 0. 6 0.9 0. 8 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 
AMERICAN BRANDS: 
TOBACCO 3.3 5.5 4.7 4.2 3.7 4.3 3.8 5.1 
NON-TOBACCO 5.1 6.2 4. 9 5.0 4.3 5.4 .5 .1 7.1 
TOTAL 4.2 5.8 4. 8 4. 6 4.0 5.0 4.5 6.3 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Effects of Diversification 
In the years 1979-1987 the tobacco companies have decreased 
their dependence on tobacco through investments in un related 
businesses. However, tobacco is still the major contrib utor 
to operating income, as shown below: 
COMPANY PERCENT OF OPERATING INCOME 
PROVIDED BY TOBACCO (1986): 
Philip Morris 
RJR-Nabisco 
American Brands 
Loews 
7 5 
63 
59 
53 
By analyzing the companies' acquisitions and divestit ures we
observed that Philip Morris, RJR-Nabisco, and American are
more diversified today than they were in 1979, as meas ured by
their Herfindahl concentration indices. However, these three
companies are represented in less industries today than they
were in 1979. This result is due t9 correction s in their
diversification strategies, away fro
m the "div e rsified
congl merate" 3.pproach to a more 
c:nr1scrvati·,e strategy which
builds upon their marketing stre
ngths.
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Loews, on the other hand, had to rel y heavily on tobacco 
income in the early 1980' s. But, having pa s sed through the 
diff iculties in its financial servi ces businesses, Lo ews 
r esum ed its diversification through portfolio manag ement 
strategi es . It divested its original the ater business, made 
heavy investme nts in CBS and other unrelated businesses. 
On ly Phil ip Morris and RJR-Nabisco made signif icant 
investments in the toba cco business . These two market 
leaders are poised for a continuing head-t• ·head battle in 
the years ahead. The other compa nies are continuing to 
support their cigarette operations, but only to the extent 
that they generate cash for contin ued growth in unrelated 
areas. 
In comparing the relative successes of the tobacco companies 
outside th e tobacco businesses, the advantage must be given 
to American Brands . Its n on-tobacco businesse s ha ve the 
h ighest profit margins and ROA' s of the four companies 
analyzed. After its initial loss of superiority in the 
cigarette industry, American set upon a diversification
strategy which allowed it to grow in spite o f  its losses in
cigar ette volume and market share . Its stra tegy of making
small acquisitions to add t o  its busin ess lines has worked
well, and will probably continue in the future. American,
like Philip Morris and RJR-Nabisco,
 made some mid-co urse
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c o r r e c t i o n s, wh e n  i t  g o t  rid of s ome bus inesses to 
concentrate in its areas of strength. 
Diversification as a Corporate Strategy 
Although most of the literature on the indust ry te nds to 
focus on diversification as a result of the s moking and 
health controversy, the tobacco companies ha ve gone through 
an evolution in the last decade which is very similar to that 
of many other diversified corporations During these years 
of corporate raiders and accelerated merger and acquisition 
activity, external forces have caused the cigarette companies 
to re-ev aluate their diversification strategies, resulting in 
major c h a n g es i n  d i re c t io n . T h ey e xp e r ie n c e d t h e  
difficulties o f  managing the growth and synergy of unrelated 
subsidiaries, and modi fied their strategies based on this 
experience . 
The analyses of financial performance inside and outside the 
industry, reported in the previous chapter, point to the 
single largest challenge that the industry has faced in terms 
o f  diversification de cisions- the ide ntification a nd 
acquisition of businesses with profit margin s appr oaching 
those produced by tobacco. The results show that none of the 
businesses acquired by the companies studied have produced 
pr ofit margins approaching those of the core cigarette 
business. Therefore, as the compan ies h a ve pu rsu ed
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dlversiflcation strategies, they have left themselves open to 
the q uestion of whe the r their s to c k h o lders hav e t r u ly 
benefitted f rom these strategies, 
One of the premises, or "facts of life about diversification" 
sta ted by Po rter is: 
Sha reholder s can diversify their own por t f olios o f  
s tock s by sel ec t ing those tha t be�t m at c h  thei r  
preferences and ri sk profil es. Shareholders c a n  often 
diversify mo re ch eaply than a corporation because they 
ca n buy shares at the market pr ice and av oid hefty 
premiums (55). 
According to Porter, .corporate strategy cannot su cceed 
u n l es s it t ruly adds value- to the b usiness u nits b y 
pLoviding tangible benefits that offset the inherent costs of 
lost independence and to sha reholder s by diversifying in a 
way that they could not repl icate (55) 
The question of whether tobacco company s t ockholder, arc 
be tter off as a result of diversification strategi es can only 
b e  appro a ched in a hypothetical se nse- any a ttempt at 
quan tification wou ld quickly l ead to a se t of "what if" 
s�en arios, comparing ��su l ts achieved by the diversified 
company with what the parent and subsidia ry coul d have 
achieved independently. Thi s type of analysis would have 
been difficul t, if not impossib le to co nduct. Ho,.,..ever, by 
compar ing the fina ncial performance 0 f t he cigarette 
companies to each other over the san
e time period we were 
a b le to observe their relative successes outside the 
industry. This non-tobacco pe rformance is an indicalion of 
the value that the acquired businesses have added to the 
corporations . 
The cigarette companies' strategies have been af fected by 
factors specific to their industry, a n d  by the radical 
changes in the financial markets of the 1980's . Their future 
successes and failures will be based upon how they formulate 
a n d  im plement strategies to compete in their traditional 
business while enlarging their p articip atio n  i n  other 
businesses . As this story continues to unfold, we can look 
for co ntinued patterns of acquisitions by American, RJR­
Nabisco and Philip Morris, while Loews continues its gradual 
absorption of CBS, and it portfolio management strategy. It 
w i l l  also be interesting to observe the re-emergence of 
Liggett as a public corporation, and at its renewed attempts 
at diversification . 
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APPENDIX 
Financial data from corporate annual reports. 
(All dollar figures are stated in millions of dollars) 
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f,i-:V-.iNUE -::,.tiCOMS RE.\d:::}rnE HICOHE REVEIWE INCOIIB REVENUE INCOME REVENUE INCOME:: RE.Vl::NUB- INCOJ-IE REVENUE INCOME REVENUE :NCOHE 
FQQO PRQDUCTS 1, 9 62 12� :., 265 94 2,334 100 3, 156 102 4, 491 33 4 4, 5 98 391 8,533 763 9,236 820 
TF . .,\NSPCRT ATI·JH l, 220 5� 1,414 G6 1, 623 103 l, 583 157 
£NFRCY- b7 S bG ns 183 l, J 70 247 l, 332 215 1,271 190 
l' �CK.AG l NG PR'.lDUCTS us 15 205 11 
S;.? IRl'fS & �nNES 1,30) 133 
MI SCELLkiEOU S 405 25 SOB 36 580 21 138 31 
LLSS: lNTE:Rco. SALES (9 ·1) (" 1) (124) (62) (165: (0) ( 15 9) (16) (147) (91) (147) ( 91) (83) 
TC.Li,\CC.), TOT i\L 5, o 3 3 >l G 1 5, 60 9 �78 6, 12!, ., 093 6, 655 l, 160 7,388 1,127 7 I 685 l,2sB 8,062 l, 4 8 3 8, 9 9 6 1, 65 9 
Dt)�-W.STIC TODl-.CCO J, 18 3 720 3, 5 21 ua1 3, 9 5,,· 911 
n;T• L TOBAC�O 1, 8 51 14 ,1 2, 0 8 B 171 2, 15; 119 
c-' i,::,;-ri,L 8, 93 S 1, 0[1 10, JS!l l,2(.9 11, 69: 1,501 13, 07 5 1, 5 9·1 13,SJJ 1, 5 8 7 12,914 l, 619 H, 595 2, 16] 19 535 2, 617 
0 
t•-) 
io::1.-,::::co, 5 ni 79'1, 54'1, 77'!. s:·. 7 J % SU 7 3 • 55% 71% sn BO\ 0%- 69% ,\ 6• 6H 
!.l·.:JN·~':C!JACCC. H% 21% 46i 23 'l> 48' 2H r: '.t\ 27, 45% 29% 41 % 20% SL\ 31\ 54� 31% 
H:•:;u-. INDr:X 0 . 61 0 'J 5 0 ,63 0 31 0 65 0, 43 .6C 0 .11 0,58 . 43 a .51 0 30 0 , SC 0 40 0, 5 6 0,50 
TODACC:) vs. NCN-TC3ACCO CAPITAL INVESTt-SNTS 
Jt.J·IE:-..:ICA:-1 B:"'J"illDS: 
YEfu, 197 9 1980 1981 l982 1983 1934 1985 198 6 
::APITAL IN\'2ST!1ENTS: 
TOBACCO 48 93 78 68 60 63 62 85 
!<0:l-7013.l\CCO 74 95 83 79 76 101 107 168 
TCTAL: 123 188 161 l17 137 164 169 254 
TOB. FRAC. O? TOTAL 0. 4 0 0.50 0.49 0.46 0,44 0.38 0.37 0. 3 4
ASSSTS: 
TC�.4.CCO 1. 4 9 () 1, 705 1, 664 1, 633 1, G20 1,440 l, 5,rn 1, 69] 
Not-i-TC3ACCO 1,447 1,530 1,699 1,561 1,787 1,869 2,085 2,357 
TOT Id_. : 2 937 3,235 3,363 3,194 3,407 3,308 3, 732 4, 050 
:'�3. FRAC. Ci" TOTAL 0. 51 0.53 0. q 9 0,51 0,48 O.H 0.44 0. 42 
CA?. I��\l. ;-....s � - CF ASSSTS: 
T(:>?,":. CC'O � ':.25 � q 6 4 . 7 0, 4 _::_si J. 73 � 4. JH· 3 79 .J. c1si 
!'::·:·1-T82,ACCO s. 12 °6 6 .13 4.88'.li 5 . 04,,,. 4. 27i 5. �2-% 5. lJ 7.1-1% 
'10T.Y-L: -: l 7, C ., 80 4. 79'!; 4. ,;o,; 4 .on, 4.]51; .:.1 'j4 6.2n 
>--' 
CJ L0J.',-,'.; CG� ).PQR,.;.T roi;: 
w 
Y�. ?i..!:?. 1. 9"/ '.) :!.. ,.180 1981 1982 1933 1934 1985 l'J,l G 
,,' :�1· "IT;. r, r�;,.,rF.:::. I'�,.£1�T:�:: 
'I,J!:lACCO 15 15 23 12 14 21 17 16 
':Oll-EH,l\CCO 34 36 fi[l 66 57 SB 56 01 
TVJAL; 50 51 91 78 71 78 73 97 
,CiJ. ,·;c),C. Di:" TOT;V, 0. 31 0.30 l). 25 0.15 0.19 0.26 0. 2-1 0.15 
.-\:,: ,-:r,: �·· 
';OB,\CCO 583 576 577 550 566 592 541 561 
::ON •TOGr,.cco e, 2611 0, S4 9 9,337 J,838 10,944 ll,9GS 15, 57fl B, 464 
TOTl\.L; 3 I 8•13 9,125 �, 914 10,336 11,510 12,557 16,120 19,024 
'i:OB. i'"R.l\C. Cf' TOTAL 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 
- :�v. AS � OE ASSETS:
-�oa;,,cco 2.62'li 2 63", 3. 91% 2.09% 2 .39% 3. �(!% 3.2l'ls 2, 81',-
':�,N-'rO?.A·:co 0. 42' 0.42� o. 73'l, 0. 67% 0. 52',, 0. 4 8 i 0. 3 6" 0.44% 
TOTAL: D. 5 6!! 0. 5 61,- 0,921, 0.75%- 0. 62'! 0. 62% 0.45% 0.51% 
'· .,. 
5. ). 
TO!JACCO VS. NON-TOBACCO CAPITAL INVESTMENTS 
PHILIP MORR.IS: 
YEA.". 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1904 B85 198 6 
CAPITAL INVESTMENTS; 
TOBACCO 197 378 557 499 320 1.63 151 191 
11011-TOBJ\CCO 386 2 99 305 286 175 9 •l 158 475 
TOTAL: 583 677 8 61 785 495 257 309 666 
TOB. FRAC. OF TOTAL 0. 3 4 0. 5 6 0.65 0. 64 0. 65 0. 64 0.49 0.29 
i,SSETS: 
TOBACCO 3,338 3,926 4, 836 5,071 5,114 5,149 5, 622 5,808 
NOtl·TOBACCO 2,714 3,049 3,503 3, 633 3, 146 7., 910 10,396 10,365 
TOTAL: 6,052 6,975 8,339 8,7D4 8,261 8,059 16,018 16, 173 
T03, FRAC. OF TO?AL J.55 0.56 0.58 0.58 0. 62 0.64 0.35 0. 3 6
Cl2. I:N. 1\S " OF ASSETS: 
TOBACCO 5.90% 9.63'!< 11. 51'!< 9.84% 6.260 3.17% 2. 69% 3 .29% 
NCN-TOBACCO 1-1 .22. 9. G,:% 8. 7C'ls 7.86% 5.55% 3.22% 1.52, 4.58'.t 
TOT�: 9.63% 9. '/l 'ls 10.33% 9.02% 5. 99% 3 .19% 1. 93% 4.12% 
I-' 
a 
.::, R. ,J. RE:"0iOLDS:
Ee . .R 197 9 19iJi.) 1981 1932 1983 19 8 ·1 1985 198 6 
C/..2 t1iA.I, Il!VESTMENTS: 
TO:'..'<CCO 78 121 166 226 371 517 647 613 
HON-TOBACCO 607 759 604 603 554 296 547 434 
TOT,J,: 68 •1 800 770 829 925 Bl3 1, 194 1,047 
TOB. FRAC OF TOTAL 0,11 0. 14 0.22 0.27 0.40 0.64 0.54 0.59 
ASSETS: 
TOBACCO 2,044 2,233 2,735 3,094 3,240 3,660 4,496 ,1, 883 
NON-TOBACCO 4,378 5,123 5,361 7,261 6, 634 5, 604 12,434 12, 13 6 
TOTi\L: 6,422 7,355 8,096 10,355 9, 874 9,272 16,930 17,019 
TO[L FRAC. CF TOTAL 0. 32 0,30 0.31 0.30 0.33 0. 40 0.27 0.29 
CA?. INV. A.s % OF ASSETS: 
TOBACCO J .81% 5. 42% 6.06% 7.30% 11. 45 % 14.09% 14.39%- 12.55% 
NON-TOBACCO 13. 85%- 14. 81%- 11.27% a.Joi 8.35% 5.28% 4. 40% 3.58% 
TOTi\.L: 10.66% 11. 96% 'J,SH 8,01% 9. 37% 8.77% 7.05% 6 .15% 
